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This thesis examines Russian organized crime and its affect on the stability of 
Russia. There have been numerous assertions by US policy makers that Russian 
organized crime affects the national security of the United States, so that aspect will 
also be analyzed. This research examines the structure of organized crime and the 
illegal activities it engages in. Then, it determines whether the Russian law 
enforcement system is capable of stopping crime. It also evaluates the threat 
organized crime poses regarding nuclear smuggling which is considered the most 
serious threat to US national security. Finally, and most importantly, it puts 
Russian organized crime in perspective to US national security interests. It 
concludes that Russian organized crime does threaten the stability of Russia, but it 
will not destroy the Russian state. Helping Russia fight its organized crime problem 
is in the interests of the United States and is compatible with the stated foreign 
policy objectives of the United States. 
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Organized crime in Russia has been getting a significant amount of attention in the 
press and academia recently. There have also been numerous statements made by the 
heads of several United States government organizations and by politicians leaning toward 
the conclusion that Russia is being overtaken by the mafia and that the security and 
stability ofRussia is in danger. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the threat of 
organized crime with regard to the stability of Russia and to the national security of the 
United States. If the threat is found to be real, it will also prescribe actions that the United 
States should take to lessen this threat. 
Russian organized crime relates to United States national security through the 
stability aspect. The main goals ofUS policy towards Russia should be stability and 
democracy: promoting the establishment of a well-ordered, law-abiding Russian society, 
with a legal system similar to that in the US. Organized crime may threaten this stability in 
a number ofways. If privatization, democracy, or the free-market economy should fail, 
Russia's stability could be jeopardized. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters and uses content analysis to evaluate what 
has been written on the topic. The introduction analyzes the current situation in Russia 
with regard to the following areas: political, economic, military, and social. It lays the 
foundation that makes Russia susceptible to organized crime. Chapter II discusses the 
debate surrounding whether organized crime actually exists in Russia, defines organized 
crime, and then analyzes its structure. It then looks at the crime situation focusing on 
what is considered "traditional" organized crime such as protection, privatization, and 
XI 
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violence, and how these enterprises effect the economy. Chapter Til explores the law 
enforcement efforts in Russia to see if Russia can handle this problem. The following 
chapter evaluates the threat organized crime poses regarding the smuggling of nuclear 
materials from Russia. Nuclear proliferation is undoubtedly the greatest threat to United 
States national security and possibly the world in the post-Cold War era. The final chapter 
decides whether organized crime poses a threat to United States national security and 
whether the United States should help Russia solve its crime problems. 
The research points out several conclusions regarding organized crime and the 
stability ofRussia regarding United States national security: 
+ Russia is and will continue to be a dynamic environment that provides fertile 
ground for organized crime to grow. 
+ Organized crime does exist in Russia and controls a substantial portion of the 
economy (between 35-40% of GDP). 
+ Organized crime does threaten the stability of the Russian economy, the 
privatization process, and democracy. 
• Foreign investment in Russia may be deterred due to the effects of organized 
crime and other problems. 
+ Russian law enforcement, including the police, judicial, and law making 
process, is inadequate to deal with the Russian mafia problem. 
• Reform of the whole Russian economic and legal system is required to curb 
organized crime and should be the first order of business. 
+ The threat of organized crime being involved in the smuggling of nuclear 
weapons or materials is low. There are other activities that are more 
profitable and less risky than nuclear smuggling. No extraordinary measures 
are required to deal with organized crime and nuclear smuggling. 
• Organized crime does not threaten the vital interests of the United States, but 
it may threaten its well-being. 
Xll 
• The United States should aid Russia in its fight against organized crime. 
Fighting organized crime in Russia is consistent with the United States' overall 
foreign policy and the National Security Strategy. 
Russian organized crime will not go away in the near future unless drastic changes, 
both micro and macro, are made by the Russian government. These changes will be 
painful for those in power who are dependent on corruption. Reform must start at the top 
with the elected officials. A complete reform of the Russian legal system is also required. 
Citizens of Russia will need to feel that the legal system is working for them especially 
regarding property rights and safety. Stopping police corruption will also be a difficult 
task but is equally important. 
Economic reform is also a critical component in stopping organized crime. 
Barriers to free trade must be taken down and anyone who wants to start a business 
should be allowed that right. The tax code must be changed, at the state, regional and 
local levels, to prevent the government from taking away profits of the businesses and 
allowing for reinvestment in the Russian economy. A fair tax code would also help the 
Russian government in collecting taxes; not paying taxes has become a major problem for 
the Russian government. This also may stop the mafia from threatening to turn in 
businesses who do not pay their taxes. 
The United States seems to be on the right track in dealing with the Russian 
organized problem and this thesis makes the following policy recommendations: 
• Continue funding for the FBI office in Moscow. It provides a valuable service 
for American businessmen in Russia and also provides a means for 
coordinating crime investigations with the MVD. Limits on the FBI's 
authority should be clearly stated and adhered to so as to not interfere with 
other US efforts in Russia. 
Xlll 
• Continue funding for the training programs that enhance the capabilities of 
Russian officials to conduct better law enforcement. These training programs 
include, but are not limited to, the International Law Enforcement Academy 
in Budapest and the training programs conducted by the FBI in Russia and 
the United States. 
• US agencies also need to educate American businessmen who want to venture 
into Russia. They need to be fully aware of the risks involved such as 
extortion, violence, and the lack of legal protection. A database of known 
organized criminals needs to be established and made available to these 
businessmen. 
• All aspects of Russian organized crime that are international in nature must be 
aggressively pursued by the United States. This includes drug trafficking, 
money laundering, and operations conducted in the United States. 
• The key to solving, or at least slowing down the organized crime problem in 
Russia is economic and legal reforms. The US should provide any assistance it 
can to Russia to help them modify their economic and legal systems to 
discourage organized crime. Economic reform should be geared towards 
lowering inflation, creating a fair tax code, and creating competitive markets. 
Legal reform should center on establishing contract and property laws and 
creating laws that are tough on crime but still protect civil rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Organized crime in Russia has been getting a significant amount of attention in the 
press and academia recently. There have also been numerous statements made by the 
heads of several United States government organizations and by politicians. All of these 
articles and statements lean toward the conclusion that Russia is being overtaken by the 
mafia and that the security and stability of Russia is in danger. Russian organized crime is 
a relevant topic due to the fact that the directors ofboth the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have said that United States 
national security is affected by Russian organized crime. The following is a sample of 
these statements: 
• But the central question about crime, really, is its affect on Russian attitudes 
towards the revolutionary transformations in their own country. It is going to 
determine their future stability, and by implication our own. 1 
• The alternative [to not helping Russia] is a criminal state with nuclear weapons. 
And that's something we thought we just finished living with for the last 50 years. 2 
• Crime, and particularly organized crime, has become one of the most dangerous 
forces to arise from the collapse of the Soviet system ... and it may ultimately pose 
a threat to peace not only in that region of the world, but others as well. 3 
Statement of Stephen Handelman, author of Comrade Criminal: Russia's New 
Mafiya and an expert on Russian organized crime. "Briefing on Crime and Corruption in 
Russia", Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington D.C., Jun 10, 
1994, p. 10. 
2 Statement of Stephen Handelman. Ibid, p. 15. 
Statement of Senator Sam Nunn before the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, "International Organized Crime and its Impact on the United States", 
103rd Congress, May 25, 1994, p. 1. 
1 
• In addition, we have deep concerns about the future of democracy in Russia in light 
of the growing strength of these crime groups. The end of democracy in Russia 
would certainly endanger peace for the entire world. 4 
• The success or failure of President Y eltsin and the Russian government in meeting 
this threat [organized crime] will affect both the future ofRussia and the national 
security interests of the United States.5 
This thesis evaluates the threat of organized crime with regard to the stability of 
Russia and to the national security of the United States. If the threat is found to be real, it 
will also prescribe actions that the United States should take to lessen this threat. Since 
the end of the Cold War, nonmilitary threats have arisen that may affect the national 
security of the United States. Paul Kennedy makes the following argument in his book, 
Preparing for the Twenty-First Century. 
Forces for change bearing down upon our planet could cause instability 
and conflict in the future, and that governments and peoples need to 
reconsider their older definitions of what constitutes a threat to national 
and international security ... there now exist vast nonmilitary threats to 
the safety and well-being of the peoples of this planet which deserve 
attention. 6 
While Kennedy did not specifically mention crime as one of these threats, it does 
qualify as a nonmilitary threat. Robert A. Kaplan in his article "The Coming Anarchy" 
pointed out the significance of crime in the future, "West Africa is becoming the symbol 
ofworldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy 
4 Statement ofLouis J. Freeh, Director of the FBI, Ibid, p. 12-13. 
Statement ofR. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Linnea 
P. Raine and Frank J. Cilluffo, eds., Global Organized Crime: The New Empire of Evil, 
(Washington: CSIS, 1994), p. 136. 
Paul Kennedy. Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, New York: Vintage 
Books, 1993), p. 14. 
2 
emerges as the real'strategic' danger. "7 Parallels can be drawn between Russia and West 
Africa with regard to crime and stability. 
Russian organized crime relates to United States national security through the 
stability aspect. The main goals of US policy towards Russia should be stability and 
democracy: promoting the establishment of a well-ordered, law-abiding Russian society, 
with a legal system similar to that in the US or others in Western Europe. Organized 
crime may threaten this stability in a number of ways. If privatization, democracy, or the 
free-market economy should fail, Russia's stability could be jeopardized. While organized 
crime is not the only factor that could cause the failure of any of these variables, it is 
worth exploring. 
A. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
Based on the statements made earlier in the chapter, this thesis analyzes organized 
crime based on the stability ofRussia using current research and material written by 
journalists and authors. While material written by journalists does not necessarily fit the 
criteria of"academic" work, in some cases it is the only insights available with regard to 
organized crime. 
The rest of the introduction is devoted to the current situation in Russia with 
regard to the following areas: political, economic, military, and social. It lays the 
foundation that makes Russia susceptible to organized crime. Chapter II discusses the 
debate surrounding whether organized crime actually exists in Russia, defines organized 
crime, and then analyzes its structure. It then looks at the crime situation focusing on 
7 Robert Kaplan. "The Coming Anarchy", Atlantic Monthly, Feb, 1994. 
3 
what is considered "traditionaJI' organized crime such as protection, privatization, and 
violence, and how these enterprises effect the economy. Chapter III explores the law 
enforcement efforts in Russia to see if Russia can handle this problem. The following 
chapter evaluates the threat organized crime poses regarding the smuggling of nuclear 
materials from Russia. Nuclear proliferation is undoubtedly the greatest threat to United 
States national security and possibly the world in the post-Cold War era. The final chapter 
decides whether organized crime poses a threat to United States national security and 
whether the United States should help Russia solve its crime problems. 
B. CURRENT SITUATION IN RUSSIA 
As a backdrop, this section briefly investigates what is occurring in Russia today 
with regard to the following areas: political, economic, military, and social. "To try to 
launch simultaneously a political revolution, an economic revolution and a social 
revolution, in a national culture that was not in fact ready for revolution at all, was to 
impose an intolerable burden on the Russian people," wrote Peter Reddaway. 8 
1. Political 
Politically, since the end of communism, not that much has changed regarding who 
is really running the country. Yeltsin did replace Gorbachev, but "by and large the people 
in leadership positions are the same people, the dominant governmental institutions are the 
same institutions, and the 'mind-set' of the majority of those in power is the same 'mind-set' 
Cited in Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 343. 
4 
as it was under Soviet power. "9 Even more disturbing are the current party affiliations 




Figure 1: Duma Party Affiliations 
The main problem, politically, is that Boris Yeltsin, if he can remain in power, will 
have trouble getting more reform bills passed. With 65% of the Duma being communists 
and nationalists he is fighting an uphill battle. Y eltsin appointed Alexander Lebed as his 
national security advisor in July 1996, and then fired him four months later. One of 
Lebed's main duties was to try to stop corruption and crime in the government as well as 
the country. He did not getthe chance to rid the government of corruption - maybe 
because that might have exposed too many high level officials. With Lebed now as an 
Ibid, p. 278. 
10 Information for graph from Peter Reddaway, "Russia's Election Results Revisited," 
New Republic, down loaded via America On-Line, Jan 15, 1996, numerous pages. 
5 
outsider, he may be able to do more to fight corruption in government. At the very least, 
he will be able to stay in the public's view by calling attention to this important problem. 
Yeltsin's health is failing and who would succeed him, if he could no longer 
perform his duties as president, is in question. Lebed's political aspirations are unknown, 
but it would seem likely that he would win a presidential election if Y eltsin is unable to 
complete his term. 11 Overall, the political future of Russia is very uncertain. 
2. Economic 
On the economic side, there have been moderate successes in the Russian 
economy. 
After 4 years oflarge annual declines in gross domestic product (GDP) 
and industrial production, the economy is showing tentative signs of 
stabilizing. The fall in real GDP has slowed considerably - down 4 percent 
in the first half of 1995 over the same period in 1994 - and overall industrial 
production effectively stopped falling in the summer of 1994. Inflation has 
been declining since the beginning of 1995 ... However, real wages continue 
to decline, and roughly 30 percent ofthe population now live below the 
poverty line. 12 
But, organized crime has taken its toll in the form oflost revenue because criminals 
depend on hard currency. The ruble is very unstable, and the criminals and most of the 
population feel much safer dealing with marks or dollars that can be quickly moved out of 
the country and that are highly valued for commerce within Russia. The economic 
reforms have now been going on for several years. 
11 
12 
All measures taken - lifting price ceilings on subsidized goods, lower-
ing barriers to private ownership, the privatization of state firms - merely 
continued the piecemeal approach that began under perestroika. They 
benefited only the criminals, swindlers, and Communist autocrats who had 
"Russia's Loose Howitzers," Economist, October 12, 1996, p. 51. 
US. Department of State Dispatch, 7, no 0, Mar 1996. 
6 
long since staked their claims to Russia's riches. 13 
In addition to the problems mentioned above, 
Suddenly Russia found itself with the makings of market but with 
no commercial code, no civil code, no effective bank system, no 
effective accounting system, no procedures for declaring bankruptcy. 
What was left over was not very helpful, especially the prevailing notion 
that it was perfectly appropriate to cheat the state. 14 
3. Military 
The military presents itself as an easy target for the mafia. Its officers are 
underpaid, if they are paid at all, and there has always been a high level of corruption 
within the military. Alexander Lebed has recently stated that the Russian military was on 
the verge of a mutiny due to shortages of pay, food, and weapons. 15 "In February oflast 
year (1993) Russian defense officials announced that they planned to discipline 3,000 
officers for questionable business practices and that forty-six general officers faced court 
martial proceedings on corruption charges." 16 There has not been a case of military 
personnel being involved with the theft of nuclear weapons or materials yet, but this is 
obviously the greatest threat to US national security and will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter IV. 
13 Handelman, p. 279. 
14 Marshall I. Goldman. "Why is the Mafia so Dominant in Russia?," Challenge, 39, 
no 1, Jan/Feb 1996, pp. 39-47. 
15 
"Russia's Loose Howitzers," Economist, October 12, 1996, p. 51. 
16 Seymour Hersh, "The Wild East; Organized Crime in Russia", The Atlantic, Jun, 
1994, vol273, no 6, p. 61. 
7 
4. Social 
Socially, the attitude of the Russian people can be summed up in the following 
statement: 
The bulk ofthe people are doing worse under freedom than ever before. 
People forget how primitive Russia is--it's Third World. Russians are 
dreaming about indoor plumbing, having a little car, not living with their 
parents. They can travel. But they have no money. They can now vote. 
But for whom? They can now say what they want. But so what? 
They're not better off 17 
Another problem the Russian people have is crime. Crime affects everyone in 
Russian society and "Russians now find themselves socially naked, without any legal 
protection oftheir interest, or any place in which they can lodge their complaints." 18 
C. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the current situation regarding organized crime in Russia can be partly 
attributed to the void in state power that was left with the collapse of communism. This 
void allowed organized crime to flourish and take the place of the state in many respects. 
If you had to describe the state ofRussia in one word, that word would be turbulent. It is 
dynamic in all four of the areas that were just described and is likely to be so for the near 
future. The next chapter looks at how organized crime has flourished and increased its 
hold on Russia. 
17 Ibid, p. 61. 
18 Vladimir Shlapentokh. "Russia: Privatization and Illegalization of Social and 
Political Life", (Washington Quarterly, vol 19, Winter, 1996), p. 69. 
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Marshall Goldman offers a theory as to why organized crime flourished in Russia 
and did not flourish in other Eastern European countries and China. 19 The first reason is 
that the other countries moved gradually toward a market economy and already had some 
market economy attributes. The other countries began their reforms by removing barriers 
to entry into the market. Russia, under Gorbachev, opened the markets to a select few, 
who then became millionaires, and actually allowed organized crime to grow. When 
everyone was finally allowed to participate in the economy, the mafia was already 
imbedded in the economic system. The second reason is that Russia did not turn 
everything over to the market. The state was very selective in what industries would be 
turned over. Third, the other countries did not break themselves into republics, as Russia 
did, and thus did not have the political and ethnic problems. This is not a complete 
analysis, though, as it does not explain why organized crime is flourishing in Ukraine. 
19 Goldman, pp. 39-47. 
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II. CRIMINAL STRUCTURE AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 
This chapter analyzes the current crime situation in Russia. It first defines 
organized crime and then discusses the debate between scholars on whether crime is, in 
fact, organized. There has been little research in this area as it is difficult to get "insider" 
information as to how criminal groups operate. Next, it analyzes the structure of 
organized crime and looks at what illegal activities the mafia engages in. It is not possible 
to cover all the activities, so it concentrates on protection, privatization, and violence. 
Finally, it will assess whether crime is a deterrent to foreign investment. A lack of foreign 
investment in Russia today could affect the future stability of the Russian economy. 
A. DEFINITION OF ORGANIZED CRIME 
The definition of organized crime is an arrangement of illegal activities of groups 
of people into an orderly, functional, structured whole. In 1978, Sutherland and Cressey 
defined organized crime in a similar manner; "An enterprise of this kind (organized crime) 
qualifies as an organization because specific tasks are allocated to individuals, entrance 
into the organization is limited, and survival and maintenance rules are delineated. "
20 
Another similar definition is given by Diego Gambetta, "The hypothesis developed here is 
that the mafia is a specific economic enterprise, an industry which produces, promotes, 
and sells private protection. "21 Gambetta sees a strong parallel between the origins of the 
20 Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi. A General Theory of Crime, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 211. 
21 Diego Gambetta. The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 1. 
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Sicilian mafia and Russia's mafia. He concludes that the Sicilian mafia evolved at the end 
of feudalism, when property rights were in question. The same was true with the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the mafia was able to find its niche in Russia due to the uncertainty 
of property rights. 22 The Russian mafia was able to provide protection of property when 
there was no state apparatus or laws to do so. 
1. Debate Over the Existence of Organized Crime 
Some scholars claim that Russia doesn't have organized crime. Peter Grinenko is 
the supervisor of detectives in Brooklyn, N.Y. He is also the most outspoken critic of the 
term "Russian organized crime" or "mafia." He states that," ... they [criminals] are not 
organized; they are individuals. They are fluid - at most, groups. Occasionally, they will 
tap on each other to perform a scam or a crime. But beyond that, they are not 
organized. "23 Grinenko is in the minority with this opinion, although he has historical 
support for such a view. In the United States, J. Edgar Hoover asserted that organized 
crime did not exist until it was to the advantage of the FBI to admit it. When Hoover 
realized that it would be his organization that got all of the credit and publicity for 
arresting members ofLa Cosa Nostra, he finally publicly stated that organized crime did 
exist. 
Sociologists, Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, also doubt the validity of the 
idea that people come together to form criminal groups. "The idea of an organized 
adversary has always appealed to the law enforcement community and, in turn, to the 
media, whether the organization be bootleggers in the 1930's, motorcycle gangs in the 
22 
23 
Gambetta, p. 252. 
Testimony ofPeter Grinenko. Raine and Cilluffo, eds. , p. 113. 
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1950's and 1960's, or drug dealers in the 1970's and 1980's .. .In fact, research routinely 
fails to find more than anecdotal support for it. "24 
There is a problem with Grinenko's theory that crime in Russia is not organized. 
During the same testimony, Grinenko says, "By the way, it is not organized crime, it is 
gangs over there, a gang structure. "25 If Grinenko is defining crime in that fashion, then it 
is in fact organized, which fits the definition of organized crime stated earlier. The most 
important aspect of organized crime is the fact that it has structure. A "gang" in and of 
itself implies structure. There could be a problem of mirror imaging in the case ofRussia. 
By calling it the "Russian Mafia," this brings out images of what people consider the mafia 
in the United States. In other words, godfathers who control criminal organizations or 
families with great political power and money. These godfathers control the organization 
and their word is usually final. Since the same exact structure does not exist in Russia, 
they assume that crime is not organized. The next section will defend the opinion that 
crime in Russia is organized by analyzing its structure. 
B. STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZED CRIM:E 
The word structure implies that there is a hierarchy to the criminal groups in 
Russia. Diego Gambetta points out that the mafia operates in well-defined organizational 
structure, has norms, has a name and its own language, and membership is precisely 
24 
25 
Gottfredson and Hirschi, p. 206. 
Testimony ofPeter Grinenko. Raine and Cilluffo, eds., p. 114. 
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defined. 26 Most authors that are of the view that crime is in fact organized, and usually see 
it as a simple hierarchy. 
In 1991, according to Russian law enforcement authorities, there were 
roughly 780 mafia gangs in the former Soviet Union; today, apparently, 
there are 5,700, including some 3,000 identified godfathers, or 'thieves 
in law' as they are called, and about 100,000 members and 3 million worker 
bees, who are responsible for roughly 35 percent of the Russian GDP. They 
have relations with 29 foreign countries, according to testimony we heard 
on the Hill last May 25th. They also run more than 200 gangs in the United 
States?7 
Claire Sterling, an expert on Russian organized crime and author of Thieve's 
World: The New Global Threat of Organized Crime, describes the mafia as being 
organized in something like a classic criminal pyramid. 28 Figure 2 shows this pyramid. At 
the base of this simple pyramid are the common street thugs, who make up the majority of 
workers. The gang leaders control the street hoods. "The supply group serves as a 
conduit, ensuring that directives from above are carried out below. The security group is 
comprised of respectable citizens -journalists, bankers, artists, athletes, politicians - who 
provide intelligence, legal aid, social prestige and political cover. "29 
26 Gambetta, p. 100-101. 
27 Testimony of Claire Sterling. Raine and Cilluffo, eds., p. 106. 
28 Claire Sterling. "Redfellas; Growing Presence ofRussia's Mafia", (The New 
Republic, 210, no 15, Apr 11, 1994) p. 19. 
29 Sterling, p. 19. 
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Godfather 
Supply and Security 
Gang Leaders 
Street Hoods 
Figure 2: Sterling's Organized Crime Structure 
At the top of the pyramid are the godfathers. The term godfather was borrowed 
from the Sicilian term used to describe the leader of the mafia, but there is a significant 
difference in that the Russian godfathers are not absolute leaders. "There are 700 known 
godfathers at large or in prison. Guiding rather than governing, they provide most of the 
brains for their subalterns. They are not absolute rulers over violently unruly and fiercely 
competitive gangs. Rather, each sphere of influence is under their control. ... "
30 
There is no single godfather that controls all of the organized crime groups in 
Russia. This is a very simplified account of organized crime in Russia, but it does show 
that there is structure to it. Sterling also points out that these godfathers do meet to 
discuss policy issues and that their power of enforcement is stronger than the 
government's. 
30 Sterling, p. 19. 
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Sterling's hierarchical model was really a mirror image ofUS. and Italian mafia 
groups. There is another way to look at the organized criminal groups in Russia that may 
better describe the true structure. There are several different structural models used in 
organization and management theory. The structure of organized crime should be 
evaluated in the context of a legitimate business since it has the same goals: to make 
money and increase its market share. "The Russian mafiya has no living memory of 
anything but success and growth, and has ambitions and expectations to match. "31 
Organized crime also has some of the same attributes as businesses: structure, strategy, 
reward system, and culture. 
1. Structure and Context 
In deciding which type of organizational structure the Russian mafia most closely 
represents, it is helpful to look at the "structure and context" matrix in Figure 3. 32 Before 
identifying which structure is applicable, the boundaries of organized crime must be 
defined. The structure that will be discussed in the upcoming sections refer to a single 
criminal organization. In other words, it could be just one of the 5700 mafia gangs 
mentioned earlier. Each organization will be slightly different, but the general structures 
should be similar. 
31 
"Mafiya: Organized Crime in Russia," Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report 
no. 10, June 1996, p. 4. 
32 Henry Mintzberg and James Quinn. The Strategy Process, second edition, 




(Routine (Need for Flexibility) 
Operations) 
Structure 
S im pie M a chine Entrepreneurial 
(Unskilled) Bureaucracy 
Complex Professional Adhocracy 
(Skilled) 
Figure 3: Structure Versus Context Matrix 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is no doubt that Russia is a dynamic 
environment. Thus, organized crime, or any business for that matter, that is operating in 
such an environment would have to adapt its structure to succeed. The leaders of 
organized criminal groups, like any legitimate business, want to succeed. The 
privatization process in Russia was typical of the fluid environment; where almost 
everything was up for grabs. Since it is safe to say Russia is a dynamic environment, this 
leaves a choice between entrepreneuriaJ33 and an adhocracy structure shown in Figure 3. 
The next question is whether criminal organizations require a simple or complex structure 
to conduct operations. Figure 4 shows the differences between entrepreneurial and 
adhocracy structures. 34 
33 Henry Mintzberg classifies an entrepreneurial structure as a simple structure. 
James Quinn, Henry Mintzberg, and Robert James. The Strategy Process, (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 531. 
34 Mintzberg and Quinn, numerous pages. 
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ADHOCRACY ENTREPRENEURIAL 
Coordination Mutual Adjustment Direct Supervision 
Structure Organic, by projects Simple, informal, flexible 
Power Fluid, selectively Centralized, personalized 
decentralized 
Context Complex, dynamic Simple, emerging 
fragmented industries 
Types Operating and Startup and turnaround, 
Administrative smaller firms 
Strengths Innovative, flexible Quick, responsive, 
dedicated, directed 
Problems Inefficient, ambiguous, Precarious, restricted 
conflictive 
Keys balancing divergence/ Sustaining viability 
convergence, directing 
conflict 
Figure 4: Adhocracy Versus Entrepreneurial Structure 
2. Adhocracy Versus Entrepreneurial Structure 
It seems that the activities organized crime currently engages in are rather simple: 
protection, extortion, etc. "Mafiosi are first and foremost entrepreneurs in one particular 
commodity - protection - and this is what distinguishes them from simple criminals, simple 
entrepreneurs, or criminal entrepreneurs. "35 Comparing the two structures in Figure 4, it 
can be concluded that organized crime groups fit more closely into the entrepreneurial or 
35 Gambetta, p. 19. 
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simple model than the adhocracy. In fact, almost every item on the entrepreneurial side 
fits into current situation facing organized criminals. "The classical entrepreneurial firm is 
aggressive and innovative, continually searching for the risky environments where the 
bureaucracies fear to tread. "36 
As Sterling points out, control is centralized within the Russian mafia and this 
especially holds true in the entrepreneurial model. "The operation is highly dependent on 
one individual who can block change as well as initiate it. "37 The characteristics of 
organized crime groups do not fit exactly into Mintzberg's simple structure. "In a sense, 
Simple Structure is nonstructure: it avoids using all of the formal devices of structure and 
it minimizes its dependence on staff specialists. "38 The leaders or godfathers of the mafia 
do rely on middle-managers to carry out their orders and there is structure to the 
organization. As organizations grow, they can no longer use the entrepreneurial structure 
since it works best with small and simple operations. A new structure is also required 
when an organization moves into more complex endeavors. It is possible, in the future, 
that organized crime may move from an entrepreneurial structure to an adhocracy. 
Henry Mintzberg describes an "adhocracy" as a "loose, flexible, self-renewing 
organic form tied together mostly by lateral coordination. "39 This best describes what 
organized crime is about; operating in a fluid environment that rapidly changes in order to 
36 Quinn, Mintzberg, and James, p. 534. 
37 Lee G. Bolman and Terrence E. Deal. Rejraming Organizations: Artistry, Choice, 
and Leadership, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991), p. 86. 
38 
39 
Quinn, Mintzberg, and James, p. 532. 
Bolman and Deal, p. 91. 
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exploit new opportunities. In comparison to the simple entrepreneurial structure, the 
adhocracy looks more like what is depicted in Figure 5.40 
Comparing the two structures in Figure 5 shows that there is no middle line in an 
entrepreneurial structure. Mintzberg defines the middle line as managers with formal 
authority. It seems that the structure of organized crime fits somewhere between the 
entrepreneurial and adhocracy structures since organized crime does have a middle line. 
The strategic apex is where the major decisions of the organization are made. It defines 
the mission and strategy for the organization and fits well with the idea of the godfather 
controlling the organization. While power is usually decentralized in an adhocracy, this is 
Entrepreneurial Adhocracy 
----~) '--~--
( Operating Core J ~.... ______ _ 
~-~-·· 
l Operating Core j 
------
Figure 5: Entrepreneurial Versus Adhocracy Structure 
40 Henry Mintzberg. Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations, 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 159, 262. 
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not always the case. 11When its environment is dynamic but nevertheless simple, the 
organization requires the flexibility of organic structure, but its power can remain 
centralized. 1141 
The strategic apex and the middle line in the adhocracy, in Figure 5, represent an 
intact structure, and the operating core is used on an ad hoc basis. The operating core 
changes frequently based on the needs or objectives of the organization. This is similar to 
Sterling1s 11Worker bees, 11 although in an adhocracy these workers are only used when 
necessary. 11 Adhoc structures are most often found in conditions of turbulence and rapid 
change. 1142 There is no other environment more turbulent and that has undergone such 
rapid change as Russia. This was especially true after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
when most ofthese organizations were formed. Given the current situation ofRussia 
today, there are new opportunities arising for criminal groups to expand their 
organizations. 
Russian criminal groups will not exactly match the adhocracy model in all aspects. 
For instance, it is difficult in typical adhocracies to distinguish a formal chain of command. 
This is not true in Russian criminal organizations, nor is it likely to change. The leaders 
rely on power for control and there is little doubt about who is in charge. If there is a 
power conflict, it is often settled quickly and violently. Other than this one difference, the 
Russian mafia will probably evolve into a structure more similar to an adhocracy than a 
simple hierarchical or entrepreneurial structure. 
41 
42 
Mintzberg, p. 144. 
Belman and Deal, p. 91. 
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Overall, there is structure to organized crime. The problem is that its structure 
does not fit neatly into a defined ideal structure in organizational and management theory. 
It has some of the characteristics of a hierarchy that Sterling described, as well as 
Mintzberg's entrepreneurial model. The current structure of organized crime in Russia 
probably looks more like Figure 6 since it does not fit an ideal model. The major 
difference in this model, compared to Sterling's model, is that the security group is now in 
more of a lateral position rather than in the direct chain of command. The gang leaders 
that Sterling described would fill the middle line and the worker bees would still provide 
the operating core. 
) ^Strategic ^ 
/Security^ ^ \    Apex      J 
Middle Line 
—""*"                                        ***•■ 
«... 
Operating Core i 
Figure 6: Probable Structure of Russian Organized Crime 
As criminal activities in Russia become more complex, the future is likely to see a 
shift toward a structure that more closely resembles an adhocracy. Recently, there has 
22 
been a decrease in the number of criminal groups in Russia. 43 This is to be expected since 
the mafia organizations strive to have a monopoly. More efficient mafia organizations will 
drive out less competitive ones in a type of criminal Darwinism. This decrease should not 
be viewed by law enforcement as a positive sign, as criminal groups are actually increasing 
their power in Russia. With the basic structure of organized crime now defined, the next 
section describes the illegal activity that these groups engage in. 
C. ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 
1. Protection 
The most common activity that the mafia is engaged in is the "protection" industry: 
the mafia takes a certain percentage of a business's profits in return for protection. 
Vladimir Shlapentokh describes, in his article "Russia: Privatization and lllegalization of 
Social and Political Life", the concept of the krysha or private roof "People look for 
protection by offering rewards on a private basis - either by making special arrangements 
with state agencies, powerful local bosses, or criminal organizations, or by creating private 
armies. "44 The most common form of krysha is paying money to the criminal 
organizations for protection, which in reality is extortion or blackmail. "This roof typically 
costs 10 to 30 percent oftheir income. As an alternative, business people can choose 
43 After a sharp increase from 1992 to 1994 in the number of criminal organizations 
operating in Russia, there has now been a small decline below 5,000. There has also been 
a leveling off of crimes committed by these groups. "Mafia: Organized Crime in Russia," 
Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 10, Jun 1996, p. 9. 
44 Shlapentokh, p. 67. 
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corrupt policemen who, for the same amount of money, will deliver the same protection 
against criminal gangs. "45 
With organized crime taking that large of a cut from businesses, it will be difficult 
for new businesses to succeed. On the whole, it has a destabilizing effect on the economy. 
This also helps to explain why organized crime is responsible for 35% ofRussian GDP. 
Money that could be reinvested in Russia is being laundered and invested outside of 
Russia. The other option for businesses that do not want to pay the mafia is the police, 
but "No one goes to the police to complain about the mafia, because the police are the 
best organized crime group in Russia. "46 
The term krysha has found its way into all forms of life in Russia. Big businesses 
can afford to hire their own private armies as an alternative to paying the mafia for 
protection. "The members of these private armies are recruited from former police and 
KGB men, as well as sportsmen ... Regardless of how well equipped these private armed 
services are, they must maintain good relations with criminal structures and observe the 
rules of the game. "47 Shlapentokh points out that there is a hierarchy among kryshas with 
the state roofbeing on top. The state is interwoven with the criminal elements. 
"According to some Moscow political scientists, the number of deputies in the national 
parliament directly connected with organized crime could be as high as 10 to 15 
percent."48 Even Boris Yeltsin had to create his own roof for protection in the form of 
45 Shlapentokh, p. 77. 
46 Daniel Brandt. "Organized Crime Threatens the New World Order," (NameBase 
NewsLine, no 8, Jan-Mar, 1995). 
47 Shlapentokh, p. 79. 
48 Ibid, p. 79. 
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new state security agencies. "It would be wrong, however, to assume that krysha works, 
that it offers a reasonable, if inefficient, alternative to the rule oflaw. In point of fact 
krysha is a highly unreliable concept. "49 Overall, the protection racket has had a negative 
effect on the free market economy in Russia. For one thing, it tends to discredit 
democracy and free-market economies in popular perceptions. 
2. Privatization 
The privatization process that began in Russia opened the door for organized 
crime. The privatization of Russia is an important step towards a free market economy 
and is now in danger of failing because of organized crime. "Russian officials believe that 
criminals are involved in roughly 40,000 state and private enterprises. Criminal groups are 
reported to have controlled about one-third of the turnover in goods and services in 
1993 .... "50 
This privatization process was a massive undertaking, and it came as no surprise to 
many authors and journalists when criminal elements took control of much of it. But, it is 
difficult to separate corruption from organized crime as they are often intertwined. "The 
Director of Central Intelligence recently testified that 30 to 50 percent ofthe profits of 
organized crime are now going to buy off Government officials in Russia. "51 But 
corruption alone poses the same dangers to privatization as organized crime. "The rules 
for privatization were fluid, corrupt officials were easily come by and most Russians had 
no money to speak of Within weeks, the Russian news agency Tass-Krim Press reported 
49 Shlapentokh, p. 77. 
50 James Woolsey, Raine and Cilluffo, eds., p. 141. 
51 Testimony of Senator William Cohen during a hearing on "International Organized 
Crime and its Impact on the United States", 103rd Congress, May 25, 1994. 
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that the mafia had 1privatized between 50 percent and 80 percent of all shops, storehouses, 
depots, hotels and services in Moscow. 11152 
The mafia did not have a hard time controlling the privatization process. The state 
instituted a voucher program to distribute state-owned property and businesses. The state 
would then publicly auction off the properties and every citizen was supposed to have an 
equal chance at buying property. The program failed because 11The mafia, which was 
behind the counterfeiting of vouchers and their fraudulent reuse, was directly threatening 
citizens in an effort to keep them from bidding at privatization auctions. 1153 The mafia then 
bought what they wanted at bargain prices. The privatization process is in definite danger 
of failing because of the involvement of organized crime. 
There is another aspect ofRussian society that leads businesses to rely on 
organized crime instead of the government. It is often more profitable to companies to 





At the Hoover Institute last December, former Y eltsin economic advisor 
Peter Filippov explained how organized crime gets their clutches into 
newly-privatized businesses. He used the vodka factory as an example. 
The government demands 80 percent ofthe factory owner1S profits, so 
the owner declares only 20 percent of his production output. The mafia 
infiltrates a few men into the factory, and figures out the actual production. 
Then the mafia boss approaches the owner and threatens to report him to 
the authorities. The factory owner pays the mafia 50 percent, which is still 
better than paying the government 80 percent. 54 
Sterling, p. 19. 
Hersh, p. 61. 
Brandt, p. 5. 
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Along with paying the mafia, the business also receives protection: other criminal 
organizations will not approach them since they usually have strict territorial rules and 
abide by them. This is obviously a problem for the government when simple economics 
leads businesses to tum to the mafia to make more money. This has a destabilizing effect 
because the state loses tax revenue; and the country loses investment funds when the mafia 
moves the money out of the country. 
3. Violence 
Violence is another major aspect of organized crime in Russia; it is the topic that 
gets the most media attention since it is being compared to the Chicago-style gangland 
murders of the 1920's. " ... The mafia's kill rate has climbed to a world record. Once, 
Soviet leaders taunted America for its sixty-odd murders per day--a mark of capitalist 
depravity. By 1993 murders in the Russian republic alone ran to more than eighty per 
day. "55 Violence is used by the mafia as a means and not an end for conducting business. 
"From 100 in 1992, the number of contract killings in Russia has risen to 500 in 1996, 
with the prices typically ofUS $5,000-20,000."56 
It has been increasingly more dangerous to do business in Russia, unless the right 
people are paid for protection. A prominent Russian businessman was killed in August, 
1995; he was the ninth person killed from a group called the Round Table. The purpose 
of the Round Table was to lobby on behalf of270 businesses that were supportive of the 
government. No one has been arrested in any ofthe killings. In November 1993, a US 
embassy worker was killed in Moscow, the first since perestroika started. He was an 
55 Sterling, p. 19. 
56 Jane's Intelligence Review, p. 9. 
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expert on crime and privatization. Again, no arrests were made. No one is safe in Russia 
from the violence associated with organized crime, especially foreign businessmen who 
want to venture into Russia. They know that the risks of doing business are great, but 
with such an unstable environment, the rewards can also be great. An American who has 
successfully conducted business in Russia said, of attempting to do business there, that "It 
is not for the faint hearted or the risk adverse. It's for the bold, or perhaps, what you call 
foolish. "57 
D. FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The question that has to be answered is whether all of this crime is a deterrent to 
foreign investors. Foreign investment will be a key factor in whether Russia's economy 
succeeds. Ideally, the US wants an interdependent Russian economy. This will, it is 
hoped, bring stability to a very volatile system. One of the problems is that organized 
crime is funneling money out of the country, and this includes the government's share of 
taxes. Most of the criminals will not deal in rubles and prefer hard currency such as the 
dollar or the German mark. Currently, Russian criminals export $1.5 billion a month to 
Western banks. 58 
Edward Luttwak argues that the mafia is not necessarily bad for Russia in 
economic terms. He believes that the mafia is a natural evolution in a capitalist 
57 Statement ofDr. Richard W. Rahn, President and CEO ofNovecon, Ltd. Doing 
Business in Russia and the NIS: Opportunities and Obstacles, (Washington: Commission 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, June 1994), p. 10. 
58 Linnet Myers. "Russian Mob's Influence Growing, House Panel Told; CIA 
Director Says Crime is Undermining Reforms, Investment," Chicago Tribune, May 1, 
1996, p. 10. 
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transformation and that the mafia is the only force that can counteract the state-driven 
monopolistic system. 59 While that fact may be true, it does not explain the low foreign 
investment in Russia. Total foreign investment in Russia was only $3.3 billion in 1995. 
Circumstantial evidence suggests a link between relatively low foreign investment in 
Russia and organized crime. "While the practice of payoffs has traditionally been quite 
common in Russia, in recent years it has become so widespread and grown to such 
proportions that it has become a real threat, and consequential hurdle, to Western 
companies seeking to invest in Russia. "60 Organized crime is not the only problem when 
investors try to set up shop in Russia. Other problems include: an unstable economy, very 
high inflation, monetary instability, and official corruption that is not linked to organized 
crime. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Russian organized crime has definitely expanded since the end of communism. It 
is having a negative effect on the economy and creating an environment that is unfriendly 
towards foreign investment. "In 1995 alone, economic crimes, thefts and embezzlements 
of state assets cost the government US $4 billion. "61 It is also taking money to pay for 
protection that could otherwise be reinvested within Russia. Increased violence against 
businessmen would also have to be considered a deterrent to investors. The Russian mafia 
groups seem to have little regard for human life and no respect for the law. 
59 Edward Luttwak. "What the Mafia's Good For,'' The Washington Post National 
Weekly Edition, Feb 12-18, 1996, p. 22-23. 
60 Simon, p. 6. 
61 Jane's Intelligence Review, p. 18. 
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While there is no quantifiable proof that organized crime has deterred foreign 
investment in Russia, it does seem like it is contributing. But organized crime will not 
completely destroy the Russian economy. What it will do is lengthen the transition to a 
more prosperous economy. Any economic activity, legal or illegal, the comprises 35% of 
GDP must be given attention by the Russian government. The question remains on 
whether Russian law-makers and politicians are giving organized crime the proper 
attention it deserves. The next chapter looks at the law enforcement situation and see if it 
is capable of dealing with this problem. 
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III. LAW ENFORCEMENT SITUATION 
Looking at Russia from the outside, it seems apparent that Russian law 
enforcement is inadequate. The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation says that it is 
based on the rule oflaw and that the state will protect human and civil rights and liberties. 
Little has been done to promote these ideas. John Deutch recently said that, "Law 
enforcement agencies continue to be understaffed, underfunded and plagued by 
corruption. "62 More importantly, "The Russian criminal justice system does not even 
have definitions of organized crime and associations that reflect the new kinds of 
production, forms of property and capital, which came to being in Russia during the last 
five years. "63 
This chapter explores the current situation in Russia with regard to law 
enforcement. Specifically, it will look at the police, the legal system, and the laws 
regarding organized crime. The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the 
Russian system oflaw enforcement can curb the organized crime that was described in the 
previous chapter. 
A. POLICE 
The notion of police officers in Russia being corrupt, dishonest, and linked to 
organized crime is not a new concept. This type of activity was apparent long before the 
collapse of communism. There are numerous examples of the police being "on the take." 
62 Myers, p. 10. 
63 Victor Shabalin. "The New Stage of the Fight Against Organized Crime in 
Russia," IASOC, 1995, p. 1. 
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The most compelling reason for police to be corrupt is the fact that they are underpaid. 
"The Interior Ministry (MVD) began 1996 with debts of 3 .4 trillion roubles (US $717 
million), including 1.3 trillion in unpaid wages. "64 Even the police Anti-Organized Crime 
T earn is underpaid. 
"Investigators in Aulov's [head of the Anti-Organized Crime Team] office make 
salaries of around $160 a month--less than city bus drivers ... Bribery is so common that 
some police on the take do not see anything wrong with it: Why not take payment for 
services rendered?" 65 Another example of bribery was told by Anatoly Kulikov shortly 
after taking charge as the Interior Minister. "Kulikov sent a truck laden with vodka 
traveling across southern Russia to gauge the integrity of his highway officers. He later 
said he was shocked to learn that corrupt police demanded bribes at 22 of 24 checkpoints 
the decoy passed through. "66 Kulikov also said that police crime has increased 
fifty-percent over the last five years and that 550 police officers have been tried on 
corruption charges. 67 
Another problem with the police force is that it is equipped poorly regarding 
weapons and equipment. While the organized crime groups can afford the best weapons 
money can buy, the police do not have that luxury. Guns can be easily purchased in 
Moscow, and most businessmen or their guards are armed with at least a pistol. "For 
64 Jane's Intelligence Review, p. 6. 
65 Lee Hockstader, "Russia's War on Crime: A Lopsided, Losing Battle", The 
Washington Post, Feb 27, 1995, p. 2. 
66 Stephanie Simon. "Go After Corrupt Officials, Russian Lawmakers Urged", Los 
Angeles Times, Jan 24, 1996, p. A6. 
67 Yelena Barsova. "Interior Ministry Collegium Raises Issue of Militia Men with 
Dirty Hands," Segodnya, Jul 24, 1996, p. 6. 
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Rbs500,000 (about 70 pounds) you can get a simple pistol; it costs more for fancier 
models, automatic rifles and heavier weaponry."68 Many of the police are quitting and 
moving into the private sector, i.e. the mafia. The money that they can make is far greater 
than being a policeman, and there is less risk. The police are also losing the numerical 
battle against organized crime. The number of members in the mafia almost equals the 
number of troops in the Interior Ministry.69 
When organized criminals are sent to prison, which is a rare event, little changes 
with regard to who is running their organizations. Mafia bosses are still able to effectively 
run their organizations from behind bars. "The mafiya is very strong within the prison 
system, and senior criminals tend to be pampered and protected by other criminals and 
also bribe and intimidate prison authorities. "70 
B. JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
The whole Russian legal system is in disarray. "Whatever the merits of court 
reform, the system was clearly paralyzed by rising crime rates. Suspects were often 
released because of the backlog of cases. "71 In order to get a criminal to the judicial 
system he must first be apprehended by the police. The previous chapter showed how 
difficult a task that can be and that most criminals are never arrested. "Gangsters are far 
68 John Lloyd. "Violence Turns Moscow Into Gun City: Many Businessmen Hire 
Bodyguards and Pack a Pistol", Financial Times, Sep 2, 1995, p. 3. 
69 Alexander Kakotkin. "Triumphant March of Crime," Argumenty I Fakty, Jul24, 
1996, p. 8. 
70 
71 
Jane's Intelligence Review, p. 6. 
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more likely to be slain by rivals than arrested. The conviction of bribe-taking bureaucrat 
or corrupt cop would be sensational news here; but such stories almost never appear. "72 
There is little or no information available to the West regarding the corruption of judges in 
Russia, but it is very likely that this is occurring. Everyone else in the system seems to be 
making money through organized crime and the judges are probably not the exception. 
One of the major problems that Russian law makers tackled within the judicial 
system was that the communist-era judges remained in office. "On June 26, 1992, judges 
were formally awarded life tenure upon election by local and municipal bodies. This 
crucial reform was intended to sever in one stroke the former dependence of the judiciary 
on the Communist Party and protect it from the whims of politicians. "73 But, tenure could 
also have the negative effect of allowing corrupt politicians to remain in office, even if 
they were legally elected. Without having to worry about being reelected, as local and 
municipal judges do in the United States, there is no accountability. 
Another problem is immunity. Under Article 122 of the 1993 Constitution ofthe 
Russian Federation, judges were given complete immunity. This combination of tenure 
and immunity gives judges enormous power. Should a judge fall under the power of the 
mafia, either by choice or coercion, little can be done by the public to remove this corrupt 
official. Another set back in the prevention of corruption among judges was the passing 
of the "Law on Combating Organized Crime" by the State Duma in 1995. "Cases related 




Sonni Efron. "The Mob Rules in New Russia", Los Angeles Times, Feb 26, 1994, 
Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya, p. 278. 
34 
judge will immediately be known to the criminal world, so increasing the possibility of 
exerting pressure on the judge. "74 In addition, the law passes several other initiatives to 
aid law enforcement in fighting crime. First, it allows for immunity to criminals who 
testify against others and complete impunity for giving false testimony. Second, the law 
allows the police to have unlimited power over any citizen. There are fears that in Russia's 
battle against organized crime it may return to a police state. 75 
C. LAWS 
There has been some progress towards creating laws that will aid the government 
in controlling organized crime. One of the main problems in dealing with organized crime 
is the fact that many of these groups use legitimate businesses as a front for their activities. 
These groups are also able to purchase foreign businesses through the illegal money they 
have acquired, and further legitimize themselves. It is difficult to distinguish what is legal 
and illegal in the Russian legal system. The Russian parliament has been working on a 
crime bill for the past two years that will aid the law enforcement community in slowing 
down organized crime. "It would ease prosecutions and impose stiff prison terms for 
organized crime leaders, permit the state to confiscate assets and give the authorities new 
powers to protect cooperative witnesses. "76 
One problem is that this legislation offends the democratic reformers in Russia who 
fear that this may go too far in violating the citizen's civil rights. "We see Russia moving 
74 Ivan Maximov. "Any Citizen May Be Arrested Now," Moskovsky Komsomolets, 
Feb 25, 1996, p. 1. 
75 
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very slowly back towards a decision to impose an old Soviet style of imposing order, with 
all of its attendant complications in terms of civil liberty and human rights, as a way of 
rescuing their society from the chaos that they see has emerged from it. "77 Another effort 
to curb crime was seen when the United States offered the services of the FBI to Russia. 
That project will be looked at in detail in the United States national security chapter. 
In recent years, the Russians have passed a new code of civil laws. It has been 
heralded as being more important than the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
"The code is viewed by some as a bulwark against revanchism, especially if a Communist 
also wins the presidency in the June 1996 election. "78 The communists did not win the 
presidential election, but the effects of this new legislation remain to be seen. The Russian 
people have lost faith in the law, and Russian businesses routinely rely on the use of force 
to settle disputes. Until the Russian people see the benefits ofthe new law, it will likely 
rely on the old methods. This is a step in the right direction, though. 
President Yeltsin passed a decree on June 14, 1994 entitled "On the Urgent 
Measures to Defend the Population Against Gangsterism and Other Kinds of Organized 
Crime." This decree has been criticized by Russian elites as unconstitutional and violating 
the rights and freedoms of its citizens. They seem to be correct on that point. On the 
other hand, there are some who say it does not go far enough and that the military should 
be used against organized criminals, including the use of summary executions. 79 The 
77 Testimony of Stephen Handelman, "Crime and Corruption in Russia", June, 1994, 
p. 14-15. 
78 David Hoffinan, "Russia Gets New Laws for Free Market", Washington Post, Mar 
7, 1996, p. A6. 
79 Shalabalin, p. 2. 
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following is some of the provisions of the decree: police can conduct an investigation 
against someone believed to be involved in organized crime prior to charges being filed, it 
allows for inspections of suspects and their relatives financial activities and takes away any 
confidentiality regarding banking practices, and individuals suspected of organized crime 
can be denied bail and held 30 days without charges being filed. 
Other efforts to fight organized crime have been attempted at the regional level. 
Moscow has been hit particularly hard by organized crime. 
The latest crime bill for the Moscow region was signed into effect on July 
16 ( 1996) as the hallmark of a new tough-on-crime era. But it is criticized 
by law enforcement officials as vague and more attuned to cosmetic touch-
ups than a radical rooting out of crime. One high ranking officer, speaking 
on a condition of anonymity, said "This can help city cops sweep vagabonds 
off the streets, but it has nothing to do whatsoever with fighting organized 
crime.80 
There is another possibility that organized crime may provide some stability 
regarding law enforcement. This is the argument that Luttwak espoused in Chapter II. 
Since the Russian state does not provide adequate protection for their citizens, the mafia 
often steps in to settle disputes. "Instead ofbeing a threat to the legal order, then, the 
mafiya is becoming its rival and even replacement. Wherever and whenever the state fails 
to fulfill the basic needs of its people this creates a vacuum the criminals can exploit. "
81 
While the mafia is efficient in settling disputes, it does not help the average Russian citizen 
who can not afford the mafia's protection. The mafia does help businesses who can afford 
80 Alessandra Stanley. "There's More Style than Substance in Crackdown on 
Moscow Crime," Ottawa Citizen, July 30, 1996, p. A6. 
81 Jane's Intelligence Review, p. 9. 
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to pay for protection and who have no legal recourse to settle disputes. This is obviously 
not the type of stability that Russia seeks in the long-term, but it may be all that Russia has 
in the short-term. It is difficult to gauge the long-term effects ofthe lack of a Russian 
legal system. 
D. CONCLUSION 
A law enforcement system that works needs to have a minimum of three elements: 
police that do their job, a judicial system that can convict criminals, and laws that support 
the efforts of the first two without infringing on the civil rights of citizens. Currently, 
Russia is failing on all three counts. There is little hope in the near future that this trend 
will be reversed and organized crime will be stopped or even slowed down. "But any 
effort to clean out corruption in the Russian government was doomed in advance, because 
it depended upon the nomenklatura in power to enforce it - and they certainly had no 
incentive to impoverish themselves. "82 When organized criminals feel that they are in 
jeopardy of being caught, they have one option to avoid being prosecuted. Along with 
judges, elected members of the Duma and Russian Federation are given immunity by the 
1993 Constitution. Once the criminal is elected, he will no longer be subject to 
prosecution while he remains in office. 
Russia has to decide between freedom and order. How much freedom is the state 
willing to give up, yet still preserve order? With the recent elections of communists to the 
Duma and the passing of harsh laws to fight organized crime, it seems that people may be 
82 Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya, p. 339. 
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favoring order. "In the longer run, though, it is easy to imagine increased stability in 
Russia being transformed into authoritarianism ... Such a scenario is in no way in the 
American interest. "83 




IV. ORGANIZED CRIME AND NUCLEAR SMUGGLING 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) poses the gravest threat to the United States and the world community. 84 Since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, this issue has been at the forefront ofU.S. national 
security policy. This chapter focuses on the possible connection between Russian 
organized crime and nuclear smuggling. The smuggling aspect includes the theft of 
nuclear weapons, or the trafficking in associated equipment, materials, or expertise. There 
have been numerous accounts in the media regarding organized crime and the theft of 
nuclear materials. "At least at this moment there has not been export of major nuclear 
weapons, though there is increasing trade in radioactive materials ... "85 Is the threat of 
"nuclear mafia" justified and does the United States need to take extraordinary action 
against it? 
The main question that this chapter asks is what is the likelihood ofRussian 
organized crime becoming involved in the smuggling of nuclear weapons or materials? 
The first section gives a brief description of the post-Cold War era with regard to nuclear 
weapons. The second section looks at the security of these weapons and materials, 
answering the question of whether organized crime has easy access to these weapons or 
materials. The next part evaluates specific cases of nuclear theft and the involvement of 
84 The Department ofDefense defines WMDs to include nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons, and has focused its concerns primarily on ballistic missiles as a means 
of delivery. Steven M. Kosiak, "Nonproliferation & Counterproliferation: Investing For a 
Safer World?," Defense Budget Project, April, 1995, p. i. 
85 Statement ofLouise Shelley. Crime and Corruption in Russia, (Washington, 
D.C.: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, June 1994), p. 5. 
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organized crime. One case, occurring in Vilnius, will be looked at in depth. The fifth 
section explores who the buyers are and what drives the market for nuclear materials. The 
last section evaluates the threat to the United States. 
A. POST -COLD WAR ERA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
During the collapse of the Soviet Union and the months following it, the main 
concern of the United States government was whether Russian authorities still had control 
of their nuclear arsenal. There was also great concern regarding the weapons that were in 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan. This period is now behind us and we believe that Russia 
successfully maintained control of the weapons. The United States and Russia no longer 
have weapons targeted at each other and all of the weapons that previously were in 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan now reside on Russian soil. 86 This still leaves Russia 
with a huge stockpile of weapons that even the Russians can not account for. The Office 
of Technology Assessment reports that "the total number of nuclear weapons has usually 
been publicly described as on the order of30,000, although occasional reports have placed 
the number as high as 45,000."87 Trying to obtain an accurate figure of these weapons 
has been a priority for both the Russians and the United States. 
86 Ukraine recently sent its last nuclear weapons back to Russia to complete the 
"Trilateral Statement" agreement, signed in January, 1995 by Russia, Ukraine, and the 
United States. 
87 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation and the Former 
Soviet Union, OTA-ISS-605 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
September, 1994), p. 60. 
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There are numerous other facilities where nuclear grade material can be found. 
88 
Russia has two main research laboratories, Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, that are still 
operational. "In addition, there are at least 20 research reactors, most fueled by highly 
enriched uranium (HEU), and 28 civilian nuclear power reactors (with 18 more under 
construction)."89 These facilities are spread throughout Russia with most of them in 
remote regions. Many experts feel that HEU and plutonium pose a greater proliferation 
threat than dismantled or intact nuclear warheads. It is considered much easier to 
transport weapons-grade material than whole weapons or even warheads. Most experts 
agree that obtaining a sufficient amount of weapons-grade material is the most difficult 
aspect of constructing a nuclear weapon. "The technical difficulty and expense of 
acquiring such material provided the principal barrier against the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons during the Cold War. "9° Controlling HEU and plutonium is one of the greatest 
security challenges for the United States and the international community.91 
Several programs were created to help Russia deal with its nuclear problems. 
These programs are: the "Nunn-Lugar" Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, 
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination, and the Material Protection, Control and 
Accounting (MPC&A). The dismantlement of nuclear weapons leads to another problem. 
Once the weapons are dismantled, they must be transferred to storage sites that are usually 
88 Nuclear grade material consists of highly enriched (>90%) uranium (HEU) or 
plutonium. 
89 Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union, p. 60. 
90 James L. Ford. "Nuclear Smuggling: How Serious a Threat?," Strategic Forum, 
~SS,no. 59, Jan, 1996,p. 1. 
91 John P. Holdren. "Reducing the Threat ofNuclear Theft In the Former Soviet 
Union," Arms Control Today, 26, no. 2, March, 1996, p. 20. 
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under civilian control. Theft would most likely occur during the transportation phase of 
the operation. Storage is another problem and is discussed in the next section. "Over the 
next decade, Russia may try to move as many as 20,000 or 25,000 nuclear weapons 
through its dismantlement process. "92 Can the Russians maintain adequate security of the 
nuclear materials once the weapons are dismantled? 
B. SECURITY OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS 
The issue of whether Russian organized crime is involved in nuclear smuggling 
would be moot ifRussia had security systems in place to safeguard their weapons and 
materials. In other words, if nuclear materials were adequately secured then there would 
be less of a chance of smuggling. Security of nuclear weapons in Russia is charged to the 
12th GUMO, which is part of the military and is vulnerable to pressures by criminal 
organizations. 93 Most of the debate has focused on the issue ofweapons-grade material at 
civilian institutions since it is perceived as easier to steal than an intact weapon. These 
civilian facilities are guarded by Ministry oflnterior forces or local militia and police. 
"Western specialists say this material is guarded by troops of the Interior Ministry, which 
is underpaid, poorly equipped and riddled with corruption. An Interior Ministry major 
general was recently arrested for corruption and links with criminal elements. Nuclear 
92 James Blaker. "Coping With the New 'Clear and Present Danger' From Russia," 
Arms Control Today, Aprill995, p. 13. 
93 Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. "Weapons Proliferation and Organized Crime: The 
Russian Military and Security Force Dimension," (Colorado Springs: INSS Ocassional 
Paper 10, 1996), p. 33. 
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materials in the civilian sector could be guarded by the even more corruptible local 
police."94 
Security at military sites is believed to be better, but still inadequate by U.S. and 
international standards. "Military and security forces have ready access to valuable state 
property; land, air, and sea transport to move that property; and specialized skills that 
criminal organizations need and can put to good use." 95 An example of the security at 
one of these highly guarded facilities doesn't support the previous argument that Russian 
nuclear facilities are secure: 
According to Mikhail Kulik, the special investigator for the Northern 
Fleet Military Procuracy--and the chief investigator of the Sevmorput 
division-- potatoes were guarded better than radioactive materials at 
the time of the theft at Murmansk. 'On the side of the shipyard facing 
Kola Bay, there is no fence at all. You could take a dinghy, sail right 
in--especially at night--and do whatever you wanted. On the side facing 
the Murmansk industrial zone there are ... holes in the fences everywhere. 
And even in those places where there aren't holes, any child could knock 
over the half-rotten wooden fence boards.' (But) ... It is difficult to know 
if the security deficiencies at Sevmorput are typical. 96 
There is concern over the large number of storage facilities used to house tactical 
nuclear weapons. 97 William Potter ofthe Monterey Institute oflnternational Studies sees 
the greatest danger coming from naval nuclear fuel. Some of this fuel is considered 
94 Paul Quinn. "Russia Called Fertile Ground For Nuclear Proliferation," Boston 
Globe, July 3, 1994, p. 12. 
95 Turbiville, p. 9. 
96 Oleg Bukarin and William Potter. "Potatoes Were Guarded Better: Stealing 
Nuclear Fuel From the Storage Building at Sevmorput Was - and May Still Be- Easy," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 51, no. 3, May 1995, p.46. 
97 Ford, p. 4. 
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weapons-grade material. 98 How did the situation in Russia deteriorate so quickly? "The 
collapse of the Soviet Union was so swift and so complete that it left a void in the 
government, economic and social infrastructure ofRussia and other successor states. As a 
result, activities that once were very tightly monitored by the KGB and other control 
organs of the State, are no longer watched over so carefully. "99 Another result of the 
economic situation is that Russia does not have the money or resources required to 
properly dismantle and then safeguard these weapons. The paradox is that they also do 
not have the money to maintain all of the weapons they own. The maintenance and 
security costs are too high, and the SRF, Navy, and Air Force does not have the 
manpower required. The end result is that nuclear materials are easier to steal given the 
security situation in Russia. 
C. SPECIFIC CASES OF THEFT 
There have been numerous cases of theft of nuclear materials from Russia. But 
there are two key points to keep in mind: first, no actual weapons have been stolen and 
second, no known buyers of nuclear weapons or materials have been apprehended. Of 
course this is all based on the assumption that the perpetrators would have been caught, 
and that Russian officials would have known a weapon was stolen. The first point is of 
significance to Russian officials since they have always proclaimed that their weapons and 
facilities were secure. This obviously contradicts the previous section which brought 
98 
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doubt about the actual numbers of weapons the Russians have, and whether their facilities 
can prevent theft. 
It seemed that 1994 was the year that attention was first focused on this issue, 
although there were cases that occurred as early as 1992. "There were five instances 
involving the smuggling to Europe of weapons-usable materials that apparently originated 
in civilian research laboratories in Russia." 100 In early 1996, Potter proclaimed that there 
were four confirmed cases of the export of weapons-grade material during the post-Cold 
War era and three cases that the shipment was stopped before export. There were four 
more cases of the diversion or export of questionable or non-weapons grade nuclear 
material. 101 The first seven cases that Potter describes are summarized in Table 1.102 
Site Organized Known Buyer Perpetrator Sting 
Crime 
Luch, Podolsk No No Insider No 
(1992) 
Andreeva Guba Possible No Insider No 
(1992) 
Sevmorput No No Insider No 
(1993) 
Tengen, Ger. No No ? No 
(1994) 
Landshut, Ger. No No ? Yes 
(1994) 
Munich, Ger. No No Insider Yes 
(1994) 
Prague, Czech. No No Insider Yes 
(1994) 
* Indications that material was from Arzamas-16 
Table 1: Specific Cases of Possible Organized Crime and Nuclear Smuggling 
100 Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, p. 30. 
101 Oleg Bukarin and William Potter. "Potatoes Were Guarded Better: Stealing 
Nuclear Fuel From the Storage Building at Sevmorput Was- and May Still Be- Easy," 
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102 Ibid, p. 2-5. 
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Potter feels that this data is interesting, but not statistically significant. He makes 
several observations from this data. First, there is no evidence that any of the materials 
came :from nuclear weapons. Second, most thefts were conducted by insiders and they 
had no buyers. It has been reported that in Russia, there were 900 illegal attempts to gain 
access to nuclear installations. In 700 of these instances, personnel from the installations 
were involved. 103 Third, the perpetrators were 11amateur 11 thieves looking to make a quick 
profit. Some authors conclude that many of the materials are diverted unprofessionally 
and do not pose a threat to the national security of Western nations. The materials 
primarily threaten the health of those who come in contact with them. 104 Lastly, only one 
of the seven cases had a possible link to organized crime and there is no solid evidence to 
prove involvement. 105 This data is dependent on whether all of the material that has been 
stolen has been identified. What percentage oftheft goes unreported? Russian officials 
admit to these cases of smuggling occurring but draw different conclusions about them. 
According to Andrey Terekhov, head of the Interior Ministry's 8th Main 
Department, the largest number of crimes related to radioactive materials--
52--was registered in 1993-1994. Most ofthose cases involved theft, 
illegal possession, and resale of fissile materials that cannot be used for 
weapons production. Materials stolen from Russian Ministry of Atomic 
Energy facilities consisted primarily ofU-238 only slightly-enriched with 
U-235. Terekhov stated that even these materials have only theoretical 
military application. Terekhov noted that in most cases, thieves were 
ordinary employees of the nuclear facilities. . . Western politicians and 
103 Arkadiy Romm. 11Atom Iz Steklyannykh Banok, 11 Obshchaya Gazeta, November 
28, 1995, p. 4. (CNS Database, Monterey Institute oflntemational Studies). 
104 Andreas Heinreich and Heiko Pleines, .. Russia's Nuclear Flea Market Tempts 
Smugglers, .. Transition, November 17, 1995, pp. 9-11. (CNS Database, Monterey 
Institute oflntemational Studies). 
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the press created myths about nuclear materials smuggling from Russia 
in order to obtain control over the Russian nuclear complex. 106 
Other examples that support the hypothesis that most thefts occur from the inside 
are provided in Figure 7. 107 
- On March 17, 1996, Tanzanian police arrested one individual and seized a 
container of radioactive cesium. 
-On March 14, 1996, Polish police arrested a man for possession ofuranium in 
Bielska-Biala. 
-On February 23, 1996, the Belarusian KGB seized 5 kg of cesium-133 which was 
reportedly sealed in glass containers. According to a U.S. diplomatic report, on 
January 17, 1996 a Palestinian in Dubai, UAE offered to sel13 kg of reportedly 
Russian-origin red mercury to a Lebanese-American businessman. 
-On December 28, 1995, the Russian FSB arrested nine members of a criminal 
organization in Novosibirsk and seized radioactive material that was identified in 
press reports as "enriched" uranium-235. The material was reportedly transported 
to Novosibirsk by middlemen, possibly from Kazakstan. The destination 
reportedly may have been South Korea. 
-On November 10, 1995 Hungarian police discovered 26 kg ofradioactive 
material in the trunk of a car and three suspects were subsequently arrested. 
-On November 7, 1995, Iranian press reported that Iranian law enforcement 
arrested 5 Iranians with 9 packets of uranium in Tehran and two other cities. No 
details were given on the origin, amount, or the enrichment of the material. 
- On April4, 1995, 6 kg ofuranium-235, uranium-238, radium, and palladium 
were found in a Kiev apartment which was occupied by an army lieutenant colonel 
and a warrant officer. The material reportedly came from Russia. 
-On August 28, 1994, a container with radioactive substances was found on a 
street in Tallinn. On the same day Romanian authorities reportedly arrested several 
individuals who were attempting to sel14.55 kg ofuranium tetrachloride ("61.9 
percent pure uranium") for $25,000 per kilogram. 
Figure 7: Examples of Theft of Nuclear Materials 
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In another article, Terekhov says that there are no organized Russian mafia groups 
specializing in nuclear smuggling. 108 Most US experts would agree with that statement to 
a point. They would agree that until now, no mafia group has been caught and that it is 
only a matter of time before they get involved. The Russians are very critical of the 
German "sting" operations, and they should be. The only thing that sting operations really 
prove is that ifyou are willing to pay large sums of money, you can buy almost anything. 
The Russians also believe that the Germans are creating a market for nuclear smuggling by 
conducting such sting operations. Along with the Russians, the German public is not 
happy with such operations. When German officials allowed 363 g. ofHu-239 to be 
brought in on a Lufthansa Flight from Moscow on August 10, 1994, the public felt that it 
threatened the lives of the passengers and German citizens. There are other documented 
cases of nuclear theft that support the hypothesis that smuggling is being done by 
amateurs who are looking for quick profits and that there is no known link to a "nuclear 
mafia." 109 
D. THE VILNIUS CASE 
One case that had a high probability of organized crime and government official 
involvement occurred in Vilnius, Lithuania. This case did not meet the requirements of 
being "unambiguous" in Potter's opinion, but he, nonetheless, believes that it occurred. 
108 
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"A five-month investigation by U.S. News and CBS's "60 Minutes" provides irrefutable 
proof that Russian organized crime was behind the mysterious shipment of beryllium 
seized by police in Lithuania. It is the first hard evidence that Russian crime syndicates 
have attempted to smuggle nuclear-related materials from the former Soviet Union. "
110 
The 4.4 tons ofberyllium111 was exported through a company known to have ties to the 
Russian mafia. The beryllium is believed to have originated at a nuclear research facility 
near Obninsk, Russia and was sent to Vilnius. "The purchase order for the beryllium, 
which came from another nuclear research institute in the Sverdlovsk region, was 
bogus." 112 Some ofthe beryllium was radioactive as it contained HEU (approximately 
200 grams). An anonymous tip led the chief of the organized crime section of the 
Lithuanian police to a bank vault where the beryllium was stored. There was no known 
buyer for the beryllium, although U.S. News speculates that there was a North Korean 
buyer who was willing to pay $24 million. 
So what elements of organized crime and government corruption were involved in 
this case? There were many organizations involved in the transfer of the beryllium. It 
started with Igor Vladimirovich Rudenko who was not known to be involved with 
organized crime. He was the deputy commercial director of AL T Ltd. in Sverdlovsk and 
also chief of the Materials and Technical Supply Department of the local nuclear research 
institute operated by MIN ATOM. Through his job at MINATOM, he knew of the 
110 Tim Zimmerman and Alan Cooperman. "The Russian Connection," U.S. News and 
World Report, October 23,1995, p. 56. 
111 Beryllium is one ofthe 16 nuclear- related materials that are supposed to be tightly 
controlled by the 31-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, which includes Russia. Beryllium 
can be used to increase nuclear weapons explosive power. Ibid, p. 56. 
112 Ibid, p. 56. 
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surplus of beryllium and saw the chance to make a large profit. ALT didn't have the 
money to pay for the beryllium, so Rudenko went to Yuri Ivanovich Alexeyev, owner of 
Karate-Do, a Moscow based sports organization with strong ties to organized crime. 
Karate-Do would finance the operation, which cost 30 million rubles. During this time 
frame, AL T changed its name to AMI to avoid being noticed. Rudenko sent a phony 
purchase order to Obninsk and requested 4,000 kgs of beryllium and 9 kgs of cesium to be 
shipped to AMI in Sverlodlovsk. AMI then went to the Urals Association for Business 
Development (UADS), an organization that operates under a "roof' of organized crime to 
have the shipment exported. UADS had no trouble setting up an export license, since the 
corrupt Sverlodlovsk regional government and its officials stood to make good money off 
the deal. 
The beryllium was to be shipped to a company called VEKA in Lithuania. VEKA 
bought the beryllium for $2.7 million on speculation from AMI, hoping to sell it for a large 
profit. AMI grew tired of waiting for VEKA to find a buyer, and found one themselves. 
An Austrian company, H-Kontor, would pay the $2.7 million. H-Kontor found a buyer in 
Zurich that was willing to pay $24 million. This buyer was never identified. A delay was 
caused when the Zurich buyer wanted a sample before paying, which proved costly, 
because this is when the police found the shipment in the bank in Vilnius. 113 
The Vilnius case shows several important points. First, there was a connection to 
organized crime and government officials. But this was not a case of organized crime 
initiating the deal; they were called in for financing and export. It should probably be 
seen as a case of trying to make a quick profit and not necessarily a new enterprise for the 
113 The Vilnius case was taken from the article by Zimmerman and Cooper. 
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Russian mafia. Second, it is not that difficult to export items from Russia, especially 
items that are radioactive, if the right people are paid. Third, beryllium is a material that 
is not necessarily prohibited from export; in this case it was prohibited because it was 
radioactive. Fourth, the shipment was not weapons-grade material, although it could have 
been used in the production of a nuclear bomb. Fifth, this case should be alarming due to 
the sheer size and weight (4.4 tons) ofthe shipment. Would it be possible to get an intact 
nuclear warhead out ofRussia? Again, this event seems unlikely but it is possible. Why 
cesium was requested in the purchase order is a mystery. Beryllium has many non-nuclear 
uses such as aircraft parts and bicycle frames. The question that remains is who would be 
prospective buyers and what drives this market? 
E. THE BUYERS 
Thus far, the evidence has shown that there has not been an identified buyer in any 
of the cases of nuclear smuggling. At best it has only been speculation as to who the 
possible buyers could be. The most common suspected end-users are "rogue" states such 
as Iran, Iraq, Libya, or North Korea. The other possible source is terrorist or 
sub-national groups. Why would any of these states or groups want to buy nuclear 
weapons or materials? Simple economics would be the most likely answer. Obtaining 
weapons-grade material is the most expensive and difficult part ofbuilding a nuclear 
bomb. Why they would want nuclear weapons in the first place is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but, "U.S. government studies have concluded that the demand for nuclear 
materials and weapons is indeed present among the world's would-be proliferant states, 
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and perhaps among sub-national groups seeking items on behalf of others or for 
themselves." 114 While certain smuggling routes have been identified, there is no clear 
pattern as to the possible end-user. Most of the research in this area has focused on 
routes that lead to Europe. 115 James Ford correctly concludes that "demand-driven" 
smuggling, if it is occurring, is difficult to quantify. Thomas Whalen and Andrew 
Williams, in their thesis, assert that Russia is a "buyers market" for nuclear materials. 116 
They conclude this because of the poor security at Russian nuclear facilities, the 
availability of nuclear materials, and the entrepreneurial attitude of the criminals and 
government officials in Russia. Further research is needed regarding the demand-driven 
smuggling that James Ford describes. 
F. THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES 
There is no doubt that preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials is important 
to the security of the United States and the world. This chapter focused on the issue of 
whether organized crime was likely to get involved in this enterprise. The likelihood of 
organized criminals in Russia engaging in this activity should be considered low. 
Previous chapters have shown the activities these criminals are most likely to engage in 
114 Ford, p. 3. 
115 Four possible routes which are used to smuggle nuclear materials from the FSU 
into Western Europe are identified, they include Poland, Czech Republic or Hungary, 
Moldova or Rumania, and Turkey or Bulgaria. Sarah Mullen. "Interim Report: The 
Nuclear Black Market," CSIS Nuclear Black Market TaskForce, November 25, 1995, p. 
12. (CNS Database, Monterey Institute oflnternational Studies). 
116 Thomas D. Whalen and Andrew R. Williams. "Entrepreneurial Proliferation: 
Russia's Nuclear Industry Suits the Buyers Market," (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, June, 1995). 
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are: protection, violence, money-laundering, privatization, etc. Crime groups focus on 
two objectives: money and power. The above illegal activities achieve these objectives 
and there is no pressing reason for these crime groups to get involved in the smuggling of 
nuclear weapons. Critics of this would say that there is a pressing reason and that is 
money. This may very well be true in the future, but has not happened thus far. The 
money offered would have to be astronomical for them to take such chances. Rensselaer 
W. Lee III believes that current smugglers are amateurs, but he expects criminals to 
become involved in the future. Lee also believes that organized criminals place a low 
priority on nuclear trade. 117 
Multimillionaires are being made in Russia through illegal activity. The 
opportunity costs of getting involved with the smuggling of nuclear materials are 
significant. The reward does not justify the risk in this case. Smuggling is an enterprise 
that requires the participants to cross the border outside ofRussia. This is where the 
Russian mafia's power ends, although in the future they are expected to expand their 
influence around the world. Presently, it is much safer for them to operate in a familiar 
environment that they have control over. As previous chapters have shown, their 
influence within Russia is great. If the Russian mafia did want to get involved in this 
trade, there is no doubt that they could be successful. The mafia has all the necessary 
resources within Russia to accomplish the mission: money, protection or roof of 
government officials and border guards, and the manpower. But dealing outside ofRussia 
presents another problem. They would be subject to investigation by other countries, such 
117 Rensselaer W. Lee III. "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking: Myths, Half-Truths, and 
the Reality," Current History, October, 1995, p. 343-348. (CNS Database, Monterey 
Institute oflntemational Studies). 
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as Germany, who are better equipped than Russia to deal with the problem. Another 
aspect that is worth future study is the role that international criminal groups play in the 
nuclear smuggling arena. 
The United States should not completely discount the Russian mafia and its 
possible involvement in nuclear smuggling. Extraordinary action on the part ofthe 
United States is not required to deal with the threat posed by the Russian mafia and 
nuclear smuggling. Addressing the smuggling threat in general should cover any threat 
posed by the mafia. What can be done to lessen this threat? 
Continued funding and support of the CTR program is critical. This will most help 
Russia in solving the paradox regarding the lack of money in Russia that was discussed 
earlier. Critics ofCTR feel that the U.S. is basically giving money to criminals with no 
accountability. In the future, should a communist win the presidential election, the United 
States may be reluctant to fund CTR. Funding for CTR has been continued for FY -97 at 
$325 million, 118 this is down from $364 million spent in 1996.119 Steven Kosiak feels that 
the U.S. should consider "increasing the level of funding provided for those assistance 
programs most closely related to preventing nuclear proliferation."120 The budgetary 
allotment for CTR is spread thin and there are many programs that come under the 
heading of CTR. While money spent on CTR does not directly combat organized crime, it 
does take away the source of the problem. 
118 Steven M. Kosiak. "Analysis ofthe Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Budget Request," 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April1996, p. 16. 
119 Kosiak, "Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation: Investing in a Safer World?," 
p. 16. 
120 Ibid, p. 69. 
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In the area of arms control, the United States must lead the way. At best, the 
United States may be able to get Russia to reduce its stockpile through reciprocity. If 
Russia sees the U.S. reducing its weapons down to START II levels, the Russians may 
also do it. But, the United States needs to be cautious in this respect. James Wirtz points 
out that U.S. nuclear and conventional forces should be designed to overwhelm our 
potential enemies, not just match our friends capabilities. 121 It is too early to tell if the 
United States and Russia will continue to have friendly relations. The United States 
should also implement most of the recommendations of the Nuclear Posture Review 
regarding weapons stockpiles. These recommendations are stockpile data exchanges, 
transparency/acceleration ofwarhead dismantlement, and a stockpile inventory cap.
122 It's 
fourth recommendation, storing weapons/material under international custody, is highly 
improbable in today's political environment. 
The authors of the Nuclear Posture Review are not alone in thinking that 
international control of nuclear materials is the preferred method. Fred Ikle calls for 
international control, but he has no plan that would succeed where the Baruch Plan had 
failed. 123 James Blaker does have a specific plan for international control. "Both sides 
would move these weapons and excess material to a secure repository in a third 
country--monitored either bilaterally or by an international presence and guarded by their 
121 James J. Wirtz. "Is Arms Control Succeeding?," Arms Control Toward the 21st 
Century, Jefferey A. Larson and Gregory J. Ruthay, eds., (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1996), 
p. 166. 
122 
"Nuclear Posture Review," 1994. 
123 Fred Ikle. "The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1, 
Jan/Feb 1996, p. 127. 
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own military units--until both countries are confident the final disposal can be 
accomplished in a fully secure environment."124 While this plan would help curb 
smuggling, it is also unlikely to be implemented due to political constraints. Using a third 
party to store weapons would infringe on the national sovereignty ofboth the U.S. and 
Russia. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that the threat of nuclear smuggling is real, but that most 
of cases have involved amateurs who are usually working from the inside. It has also 
shown that the likelihood ofRussian organized crime engaging in this activity is low, but 
possible. The key element in preventing the mafia access to these weapons or materials is 
through better safeguards. The CTR program is the cornerstone of this effort. Arms 
control will only have a significant impact on curbing proliferation if it is coupled with the 
CTR program. Although the purpose of arms control is to lessen the chance of nuclear 
war, it may have the negative effect of creating materials that are easily smuggled out of 
Russia unless proper safeguards are inacted. 
124 Blaker, p. 13. 
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V. US NATIONAL SECURITY 
It seems, thus far, that organized crime in Russia poses a threat to the stability of 
Russia. What kind of threat it poses to the United States is the subject of this chapter. 
This is accomplished by analyzing what has been said on the part of policy-makers, and 
more importantly, what has been done. There are many critics ofUS policies towards 
Russia, and their views offer insights regarding what mistakes have been made. 
This chapter first looks at the hierarchy of US policy making that affects Russia, 
specifically the US national interest and the National Security Strategy. The second 
section explores, in general, the current US foreign policy goals regarding Russia. Then it 
looks at US policy regarding crime in Russia, to the extent that one exists. Next, this 
chapter attempts to answer the question of whether the US should help the Russians fight 
organized crime. Lastly, it evaluates the current initiatives the US has sponsored to help 
Russia fight crime. 
A. US NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
Threats to the United States are usually put in perspective of the national interest. 
The national interest is what should drive all decisions regarding strategy and policy. The 
problem is that the concept of a national interest is difficult to define. The National 
Security Strategy attempts to define three types of interests that relate to security. 125 First, 
vital interests are those that threaten the existence or survival of the United States. The 
second type are important, but not vital interests that affect the well-being of the United 
125 11 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 11 The White 
House, February 1996, p. 18. 
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States. The last type is humanitarian in nature. At this stage, Russian organized crime 
does not threaten the vital interests of the United States. It might even be stretching it to 
say that organized crime even threatens the well-being of the United States. What is 
important to remember is that we are concerned with the stability ofRussia. Organized 
crime is one variable effecting the stability of Russia and should thus be evaluated in the 
context of an important interest to the United States. Most importantly, Russia is the only 
country that possesses a vast nuclear arsenal that is capable of inflicting great damage on 
the United States. That being the case, anything that threatens the stability of Russia is 
worth acting on. 
The 1996 National Security Strategy, for the first time, identifies specific 
nonmilitary threats such as: population growth, terrorism, international crime, and drug 
trafficking. 126 These are the same nonmilitary threats that Kennedy, Kaplan, Huntington 
and others have espoused and believe will be the United States overriding security 
concerns in the future. 127 
B. US FOREIGN POLICY 
In a recent interview, President Clinton cited three objectives for United States 
foreign policy: first, finish the unfinished business ofleaving the Cold War behind; 
second, dealing with new security threats - organized crime being one of them; and third, 
building a new structure of opportunity and peace through trade investment and 
126 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, 
February 1996, p. i. 
127 See Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy," Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of 
Civilizations," and Paul Kennedy's Preparing for the Twenty-First Century. 
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commerce. 128 Aiding Russia with its organized crime problem fulfills all three of these 
stated objectives. Organized crime, although present during Soviet times, has flourished 
with the collapse of the communism. Organized crime is one of the new security threats 
and it also may be blocking trade and commerce growth in Russia. Thus, fighting 
organized crime in Russia is consistent with both the administration's stated foreign policy 
and the National Security Strategy. 
C. US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA 
A firm policy towards Russia has not really been established by the US since the 
end of the Cold War. "The Clinton policy team appears to be noncohesive, understaffed, 
and lacking a depth ofknowledge on Russia as well as other key regions."
129 Whatever 
policy course is chosen by the US will affect the US and its citizens. The President set 
three clear priorities that challenged the power and ingenuity of American leadership: 
"To support political and economic reform throughout the region; to promote the 
integration of the New Independent States into the political and economic life of the 
world; and to reduce the danger posed by Soviet era nuclear warheads and reactors." 
130 
This policy needs to be updated to include the new security threats. There is no 
statement of organized crime mentioned in the Russia policy which seems odd since it is 
mentioned in the larger goals ofUS foreign policy. The first of the three main goals 
128 
"Foreign Policy; Clinton's Big Objectives Include Peace Through Trade," New 
York Times, July 29, 1996, p. A15. 
129 Mark Medish. "Russia: Lost and Found", Daedalus, Jun 22, 1994, vol123, no 3, 
p. 63. 
130 Statement by President Clinton, US Department of State Dispatch, Oct 30, 1995, 
vol6, no 44, p. 783. 
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includes the implicit objectives of promoting democracy and free markets. Successful 
privatization is one ofthe steps needed to accomplish these objectives. Most ofthe efforts 
of the White House and State Department have been in the arena of nuclear weapons 
security. This was the correct emphasis during the initial years following the collapse of 
communism as there was doubt about whether the Russian government had adequate 
control of these weapons. It is still important to emphasize nuclear weapons security, but 
the policy could be expanded to include other nonmilitary threats. 
D. US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIAN CRIJ.\1E 
It is now apparent that much more is needed if the US wants Russia to achieve 
democracy and free markets to help Russia become a stable trading partner. "Questions 
about the extent of organized crime in Russia are being raised these days in public, but not 
by senior officials of the Clinton Administration. "131 Organized crime is a threat to 
privatization, as was pointed out in the previous chapters. "To further these principles, the 
Secretary [of State] announced that the fight against international crime, narcotics, and 
terrorism would be one offive key areas ofUS foreign policy in 1995."132 
While the Secretary of State spoke of "international" crime, that term implies that, 
by its nature, it is organized crime. There is no doubt that Russia's organized crime has 
crossed its borders and is now affecting other states. Money laundering is probably the 
best example of this since the ruble is so weak. Drug trafficking is also a major problem 
131 Hersh, p. 61. 
132 James F. Collins. Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Mar 15, 1995, US Department of State Dispatch, Apr 3, 1995, vol6, no 14, p. 270. 
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with Russia as there are now connections throughout the world. James Collins points out 
that "U.S. interests are clearly involved as we face this new development. Our most 
immediate responsibility is to deal with the potential for NIS-generated organized crime 
and drug trafficking to spill over into the United States."133 This has already occurred in 
the United States, but it does not threaten US stability. The focus is on Russia, where 
organized crime does threaten its stability. 
E. SHOULD THE US HELP RUSSIA FIGHT CRIME? 
The US can aid Russia with fighting crime, and it should do so. The US has dealt 
with its own organized crime battles since the 1920's and may be able to offer Russia 
insights, although the US problems were never as severe as what Russia is dealing with. 
There are some critics, such as Edward Luttwak, that think that Russia should be left on 
its own to deal with this problem. 
Luttwak sees organized crime as a natural occurrence in Russia's transition to a 
free market economy and feels that some day Russia, on its own, will acquire the 
necessary tools to deal with organized crime. Until then, he argues, Russia should be left 
on its own. There is historical support for that theory regarding the US. Joseph Kennedy, 
father ofPresident John F. Kennedy, made his fortune as a bootlegger during the 
prohibition era and his family became one of the most politically powerful families in US 
history. 
Other critics would say that this is strictly an internal problem that should be left to 
the Russian government. This approach would be consistent with the growing faction in 
133 Ibid, p. 270. 
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the United States calling for isolationism. While the internal problem view could easily be 
argued, allowing Russia to fall apart is in no way in the interest of the United States. 
Staying engaged with Russia, even if it is only in a small way, is in the overall interests of 
the United States. 
Another option is to take a stance in the middle. "For the foreseeable future, then, 
while Russia wobbles and oscillates, the West should react with a mixture of pressure, 
support and patience. "134 This middle stance is what the US will probably do since it will 
be least offensive to the Russian population and it also will stay within the current US 
budget restraints. The next section explores the current US initiatives to aid Russia. 
F. CURRENT US INITIATIVES TO AID RUSSIA 
The main question is, have US actions backed up US declarations of policy? The 
US has been engaged with Russia in fighting organized crime since 1994. This is when the 
FBI opened its Legal Attache office in Moscow. "On the law enforcement side, we have 
programmed $15.1 million for FY 1995 training programs, and have already trained some 
350 law enforcement personnel from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus ... We may decide to 
conclude a formal and more comprehensive mutual legal assistance treaty- MLAT- with 
Russia." 135 MLAT would also consist of technical assistance and training of personnel to 
aid Russia in fighting crime. 
134 Martin Malia, "The Nomenklatura Capitalists, Who's Running Russia Now?," The 
New Republic, May 22, 1995, vol212, no 21, p. 17. 
135 Collins, p. 271. 
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Helping Russia reform its legal system is where US efforts should be concentrated. 
As chapter three showed, without an adequate legal system to fight crime, there is little 
hope that law enforcement can be successful. This section evaluates several of the US 
initiatives designed to help Russia with its organized crime problems including the FBI 
Legal Attache system, the International Law Enforcement Academy, and the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act. This evaluation will be based on James Woolsey's 
"three ingredients to battle crime." 
1. Three Ingredients to Battle Crime 
James Woolsey, a former Director of Central Intelligence, believes three critical 
ingredients to battle organized crime are required: first, cooperation between the worlds of 
law enforcement, which includes intelligence; second, cooperation among America's allies 
and friends; and third, to be smart, creative, flexible, and determined. 136 The idea of using 
intelligence assets to combat crime has some critics. Daniel Brandt points out that "Too 
often the CIA has cooperated with the mafia. This is true in the areas of assassinations, 
but it is also true for smuggling drugs and arms. "137 But Brandt is extremely critical of the 
CIA as a whole, since it failed to see the collapse of the Soviet Union coming. The CIA 
was not the only organization that fell short in this regard; few people correctly predicted 
that event. The intelligence community can obviously provide useful information to law 
enforcement officials but that information must be carefully guarded. The same type of 
security that is used with regard to military secrets must be maintained, such as not 
revealing the source of the information, especially if it is a human source. Conducting 
136 
137 
Raine and Cilluffo, eds, p. 143. 
Brandt, p. 4. 
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intelligence operations might prove to be a more difficult task than obtaining military 
secrets from the Russians, since the organized crime groups currently have more 
technological resources available than the Russian military. It is unlikely that the U.S. 
military will have any role to play in this and it is also unlikely that the CIA will be able to 
focus any assets on organized crime. 
2. FBI Efforts in Russia 
The largest effort by the US has been the opening of an FBI Legal Attache office 
in Moscow. The plan was to put two FBI officers in Moscow to help the Russians 
combat crime. The idea that two FBI officers will have an impact on an organized crime 
network with over 5,000 gangs is debatable and has fallen under much criticism. The first 
problem was that the FBI did not have any Russian-speaking officers to send, so the 
program was delayed for six months. "This is why two FBI agents with no knowledge of 
the Russian language or crime custom and dependent on local help in confronting 
organized economic malfeasance have about as much chance as General Custer at the 
Little Big Hom." 138 Regardless of the criticism, the FBI is adding a third agent to the 
Moscow office. In the next four years, the FBI plans to double the amount of agents they 
have working overseas which has come under criticism by other US agencies. "Some U.S. 
diplomats and intelligence officials have suggested that the FBI plan amounts to empire 
building. They are concerned with FBI agents stumbling into U.S. spies and 
drug-enforcement officials doing similar work." 139 But Director Freeh pointed out that 
138 Craig Copetas. "What a Sloppy Way to Tackle the Tyazhki", Business Times, Jul 
19, 1994, p. 16. 
139 
"FBI Criticized for Overseas Expansion Plan," San Jose Mercury News, Aug 20, 
1996, p. A6. 
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"FBI Agents stationed overseas are not intelligence officers; they are not a shadow 
intelligence agency; and they do not engage in espionage. They are law enforcement 
agents -- dedicated to fighting organized crime, terrorism, nuclear smuggling, violent 
crime, drug trafficking, and economic crime." 140 As long as the FBI keeps to this type of 
activity, there should not be a conflict of interest with other US agencies. 
The justification for the Legal Attache program is that "President Clinton is 
committed to protecting American citizens and our borders against these threats while 
strengthening the international structures and institutions that will allow us to build a more 
integrated global community. "141 In a speech given by the Director of the FBI in 1995, 
the following objectives were stated for the FBI office in Moscow: 
The FBI's goals are simply stated -- to protect the United States and its people, 
to enforce our laws. Any American or American company doing business in 
other countries should take great care to not violate any U.S. laws in their 
operations abroad. Any such violations will be vigorously investigated by 
the FBI. We will also cooperate fully with other countries whose laws have 
been violated by Americans ... The basic advice to U.S. companies is to not give 
in to any extortion demands. 142 
The FBI is in Moscow to help coordinate complaints that American businessmen 
have. The FBI coordinates with the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) and have established 
a solid working relationship. Thus far, the FBI and MVD have worked together to solve 
several major cases. "From July, 1994 to the present, the number of cases worked on by 
140 Statement ofLouis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, 
before the Senate Appropriations Committee- Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 
"Hearing on International Crime," Mar 12, 1996. 
141 Vice President Gore, remarks at the US Military Academy, West Point, NY, Oct 
17, 1995, US Department of State Dispatch, Oct 30, 1995, vol6, no 44, p. 784. 
142 
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Conference," Washington, D.C., Mar 30, 1995. 
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our Moscow Legal Attaches has increased from 20 to 200. "143 "The FBI office in 
Moscow has been instrumental in solving a string offinancial crimes to the tune of$10.8 
million committed by a Russian group of criminals against 24 Russian companies. "144 
Director Freeh describes this as building cop-to-cop bridges between the United States 
and Russia. Information is also flowing from the United States to Russia in the form of 
locating Russians in the United States who have fled Russia with large amounts of illegal 
money. 
In addition to working together to solve crimes, the FBI is providing Russia with a 
more valuable tool with which to fight crime, training. During FY95, the FBI trained 
4,400 foreign law enforcement personnel. 145 "The FBI alone has already conducted six 
separate seminars - four in Russia and two at our training academy in Northern Virginia. 
More are scheduled throughout the year, mostly in Russia in order to reach the widest 
possible audience. "146 In addition, the FBI is also performing "in-country training needs 
assessments. "147 These assessments consist of analyzing a country's law enforcement 
training system and making recommendations to better improve training and force 
structure. While training alone will not completely solve Russia's crime problem, it is a 
step in the right direction. The FBI's efforts have been consistent with Woolsey's three 
ingredients to fight organized crime in Russia. 
143 
"Hearing on International Crime," Mar 12, 1996. 
144 Stanislav Kucher. "Russian Mafia Will Be Instantly Crushed If They Lift Up Their 
Hand Against FBI Agent," Komsomolskaya Pravada, Jul30, 1996, p. 7. Translated by 




"Hearing on International Crime," Mar 12, 1996. 
"Hearing on International Crime," Mar 12, 1996. 
"Hearing on International Crime," Mar 12, 1996. 
68 
3. International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) 
Another program that shows promise is the International Law Enforcement 
Academy. It was established in Budapest, Hungary in early 1995. With the aid of other 
countries, the program is run by the US State Department, the FBI, and the Department of 
Justice. In FY95 the academy trained 99 mid-level officials who were from Eastern 
European countries. The plan is to expand the program in FY96 to include 13 other 
countries, Russia being one of them, and to train 200 officials. "The Academy at 
Budapest provides an eight-week professional development program similar to our FBI 
National Academy Program at Quantico. "148 The cost of running the ILEA is $3 
million, 149 and is paid for from the Department of State budget.
150 This is money well-
spent on the part of the United States. Along with giving other countries training, it may 
also be helping in the coordination aspect. The relationships that are established at the 
school may be useful in future investigations for all of the countries involved. 
4. International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEP) 
Several macro type initiatives have been put forth in recent months. One of these, 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, is designed to undercut the financial 
underpinnings of criminal enterprises. The President has ordered an action plan to combat 
money laundering throughout the globe by directing the government to identify and put on 
148 
149 
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U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 7, March 1996. 
150 Money for this program was made available by the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations under the Freedom Support Act (FSA) and Support for Eastern European 
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notice nations that tolerate money laundering. 151 This will probably have little effect on 
these countries since it is usually profitable for them to launder money and it will be 
difficult to prove. More importantly, this could be seen as an invasion of state 
sovereignty. 
G. CONCLUSION 
It is important for the US to aid Russia in establishing laws that will allow the 
justice system to work and fight crime. Reform must start at the top which will not be an 
easy task, since it will mean that Russian politicians will have to give up power and 
influence. The Russian political system was built on power, as most are, so there are 
substantial institutional problems that have to be overcome. The US could recommend 
types oflegislation that can combat crime. For instance, the US passed the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970 to combat illegal gambling at the federal, state, and local 
levels. Russia will obviously need more sweeping legislation to cover the numerous types 
of crimes being committed. 
On the surface, it seems that Russia is heading in the right direction by imposing 
decrees to fight crime. The problem is that this can be a dangerous path for Russia to take 
as far as the US is concerned. The US wants a stable Russia, but it also wants a Russian 
system that is based on laws that protect individual rights. The decrees will help law 
enforcement fight crime, but it does so at the expense of individual rights and should be 
revised. These decrees also do not get to the real problem, namely the economic policies. 
!51 National Security Strategy, 1996, p. 25. 
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Russia needs to reform its economic system to promote growth, encourage reinvestment 
in Russia, and a fair tax system. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Russian organized crime will not go away in the near future unless drastic changes 
are made by the Russian government. These changes revolve around three basic areas: 
political reform, legal reform, and economic reform. These changes will be painful for 
those in power who are dependent on corruption. Reform must start at the top with the 
elected officials. Preventing these officials from falling under the mafia's influence and 
stopping corruption is the first step in reforming the political system. A complete reform 
of the Russian legal system is also required. Citizens ofRussia will need to feel that the 
legal system is working for them especially regarding property rights and safety. Some 
type of contract law must also be instituted to protect individuals, both domestic and 
foreign, who start businesses. This may reduce the mafia's influence regarding the 
protection industry. Stopping police and judicial corruption will also be a difficult task but 
is equally important. 
Economic reform is also a critical component in stopping organized crime. 
Barriers to free trade must be taken down and anyone who wants to start a business 
should be allowed that right. The tax code must be changed, at the state, regional and 
local levels, to prevent the government from taking away profits of the businesses and 
allowing for reinvestment in the Russian economy. A fair tax code would also help the 
Russian government in collecting taxes. Citizens not paying taxes has become a major 
problem for the Russian government. This also may stop the mafia from threatening to 
tum in businesses who do not pay their taxes. 
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A. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This thesis has pointed out several important points about organized crime and the 
stability ofRussia: 
• Russia is and will continue to be a dynamic environment that provides fertile 
ground for organized crime to grow. 
• Organized crime does exist in Russia and controls a substantial portion of the 
economy (between 35-40% of GDP). 
• Organized crime does threaten the stability of the Russian economy, the 
privatization process, and to lesser extent, democracy. 
• Foreign investment in Russia may be deterred due to the effects of organized 
crime and other problems. 
• Russian law enforcement, including the police, judicial, and law making 
process, is inadequate to deal with the Russian mafia problem. 
• Reform of the whole Russian legal system is required to curb organized crime 
and should be the first order of business. 
• The threat of organized crime being involved in the smuggling of nuclear 
weapons or materials is low. There are other activities that are more 
profitable and less risky than nuclear smuggling. No extraordinary measures 
are required to deal with organized crime and nuclear smuggling. 
• Organized crime does not threaten the vital interests of the United States, but 
it may threaten its well-being. 
• The United States should aid Russia in its fight against organized crime. 
Fighting organized crime in Russia is consistent with the United States' overall 
foreign policy and the National Security Strategy. 
1. Possible Russian Futures 
What can be said of the future ofRussia? Many of the outlooks are bleak. "By 
now the situation is so chaotic that a return to authoritarian rule may be inevitable. If this 
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happens, it's likely that it will occur in a climate ofhostility toward the U.S."
152 This may 
be on the strong side, but it is not impossible. Other than the possible diversion ofRussian 
nuclear weapons to third parties, this is the outcome most feared in the US. It is unlikely 
that the US could implement policies that would assuredly prevent that occurrence. In 
other words, it will not be possible for the US to change Russian politics. Should the 
Russian people vote for a return to authoritarian rule, then that is what will happen and the 
US will have to deal with that problem. 
More control by the government will not solve all the problems regarding 
organized crime. "More control does not necessarily mean increasing government 
regulations. For example, it is essential that licenses, regulations, and permits be reduced 
to a minimum ... Such regulations and taxes offer too much room for bribery and illegal 
influence peddling. "153 Even if the Russian people choose a return to authoritarian rule it 
does not have to be necessarily hostile to the United States, but it will not be in the 
interests of the US goal of promoting democracy. 
Another alternative future could be a Russia that is run by criminals. This could 
occur, if the mafia gains enough influence to actually dictate policy in government. While 
this is unlikely, there is a possibility that it could occur and it is something that the US 
should guard against. Taking a proactive approach in helping Russia solve its problems 
today may prevent this. This type of future would also lead to more authoritarian type of 
government. 
!52 Brandt, p. 5. 
153 Marshall I. Goldman. "Why is the Mafia so Dominant in Russia?," Challenge, 39, 
no 1, Jan/Feb 1996, p. 39-47. 
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There is also a small chance that Russia may be taken over by a military coup. 
With the state of the current military, low morale, not being paid, and poor readiness, this 
option is not completely unrealistic. President Y eltsin fired Alexander Lebed for planning 
a military coup, although there was no proof that Lebed was actually planning one. 
Russia may choose to aggressively try to rid the country of organized crime. In 
order to do that it will mean disrupting the current political regime, which is highly 
unlikely. Corruption is part of the political process and is deeply ingrained. It would also 
mean drastic reforms of the legal and economic systems. It would be painful, but this is 
the only way to stop organized crime. This is the option that the United States would 
most like to see. It may cause short-term instability, but in the long run it is best for 
Russia and the United States. 
The future that seems most likely is that Russia will continue to muddle through its 
progress towards democracy. It will take care of its organized crime problems, as 
Luttwak believes, when it is ready. It will resist help from the West, unless it involves 
being given aid in the form of money. This muddling through will probably take a 
generation, since it will take that long to get those in power out, namely the diehard 
communists in the Duma and Russian Federation. The criminals of this future will be 
indistinguishable from any other legitimate politician or businessman. They will be 
indistinguishable because as they gain more power, influence, and money, they will be able 
to buy legitimate businesses and will no longer need the illegal activities to support 
themselves. This transition will not take a generation, and we could expect to see former 
mafiosa legitimate within ten years. 
76 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The FBI Office in Moscow 
The FBI office that was established in Moscow is providing a valuable service to 
American businessmen. As stated earlier, a team of two officers will have little impact on 
the crime occurring in Russia, but it is a place for US citizens to start if they have a 
problem with organized crime. It is not in the interests of the FBI or the United States to 
actively pursue criminals on their own in Russia. They would be unsuccessful at this with 
such a small team and they have no authority to do so. The best option is to continue 
working with the MVD to solve crimes. It would also be highly unlikely for the FBI to 
increase its commitment in Russia substantially since its budget is being cut along with the 
other US agencies. The goals of the FBI office should be kept simple; provide a place 
for American businessmen to lodge complaints and act as a liaison between the 
businessmen and the Russian authorities. Thus far the FBI has been successful at that 
endeavor. 
2. Training 
The best initiatives put forth have been the training types of programs. In this 
author's opinion, this is where the US should focus its efforts. The only way to solve the 
crime problem is from within Russia. By focusing on the training of Russian officials, the 
United States will enhance Russia's ability to cope with this problem in the long term. 
This will appeal to the Russian population if they see their own agencies solving the 
problem and not depending on US officials to do it for them. which the US could not 
possibly succeed at anyway. The focus areas of this training should be: surveillance 
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methods, how to run sting operations, how to use informants, and how to correctly use 
the witness protection program. What this training will not accomplish is how to instill 
honesty and integrity into the Russian authorities. Just telling them not to take bribes is 
not enough. 
3. US Businessmen 
The US agencies also need to educate American businessmen who want to venture 
into Russia. They should be made fully aware of the risks involved and of the fact that the 
legal system will not protect them or their money. They should also be aware of where to 
go if they have problems with organized crime, namely the FBI office or the commercial 
attache in the US embassy. The State Department should have responsibility for this 
since they already put out travel advisories for all countries. The problem with these 
travel advisories is that they are not updated frequently nor do they necessarily reflect 
reality. Timely information will be the key to protecting American entrepreneurs in Russia 
and elsewhere. Some type of database should be established, either by the FBI or the 
State Department, that would track cases of known organized crime groups. American 
businessmen could then check with the FBI or the embassy in Moscow before engaging in 
business with anyone in Russia. 
By aiding American businessmen in Russia, two objectives are met. The first is 
protecting US citizens abroad and the second is encouraging business investment in 
Russia. A stable trading partnership with Russia is one of the goals ofUS policymakers 
and creating an economic interdependence with Russia will aid in meeting this objective. 
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4. International Crime 
The US can and should aggressively pursue the aspects of Russian organized crime 
that are international in nature, such as drug trafficking and money laundering. They 
should also attempt to shut down any connections the Russian mafia has in the US. One 
avenue that requires further research concerns the efforts the US has made to combat drug 
smuggling from South America. Can similar tactics be used against criminals in Russia? 
5. Economic and Legal Reform 
The key to solving, or at least slowing down the organized crime problem in 
Russia is economic reform. This must be done at the macro and microeconomic levels. 
"Appointing special commissions and giving more money to the police will help, but it will 
not solve the problem in Russia any more than it will in the United States .. .Instead, 
something must be done to eliminate the underlying economic stimulus to crime. "154 If 
the United States does anything more to help Russia, it should send over more economic 
advisors to help them fix these economic problems. The Russians may be reluctant for 
such help until the economy or crime reaches a crisis. Since the economy is doing better 
by most standards, this crisis may never occur. 
Marshall Goldman points out several areas that Russia needs to concentrate on to 
help the economy grow and also decrease the mafia's influence. The first is to introduce 
new competitors to the market. Russia may resist this because they do not want to 
become a "bazaar" economy. Second, measures must be taken to increasing wholesaling 
activity. By establishing wholesaling districts, the mafia will find it more difficult to 
154 Goldman, pp. 39-47. 
79 
increase their influence and it will create more competition in the market. Third, 
macroeconomic measures must be enforced such as lowering inflation. 155 
Tax reform is an important part of economic reform, 11 ••• because nowhere in the 
world have government fiscal and tax policies driven so many people (the entire middle 
class) into a comer, making them engage in shady dealings. To be sure, income tax in 
Russia has reached 80 to 90 percent, 11 whereas in the West it is much less. 156 By 
instituting a fair and simplified tax code, the Russian government will see a rise in 
revenues. Russian citizens will be less susceptible to the mafia's influence when the mafia 
attempts to undercut the government. In other words, when the mafia can no longer 
threaten to tum people in to the tax officials for not paying their taxes, their influence will 
decline and citizens will be more inclined to pay their taxes. 
Legal reform is another area that the United States could provide Russia with 
ample information. There is no shortage oflawyers in the United States who could 
provide assistance in establishing a fair and effective legal system. While more 
authoritarian types of legislation may help law enforcement fight crime, this does not 
further the United States' goal of promoting democracy in Russia. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis could not possibly cover all aspects ofRussian organized crime. What 
it did attempt was to take a broad look at the most relevant issues facing both Russia and 
the United States today. There are many other aspects of organized crime that research 
155 
156 
Ibid, pp. 39-47. 
Kakotkin, p. 8. 
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could be conducted in. First, what is the threat of organized crime regarding the 
smuggling of chemical and biological weapons out of Russia? Since Russia has the largest 
stockpile in the world this could easily be a significant problem for the United States. 
Second, drug trafficking has also become a serious problem in Russia. How has this 
affected the United States and what is the connection to South American and the Far East 
drug cartels? Lastly, international aspects of organized crime were briefly discussed in this 
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